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Jonah B.  Gelbach 
 
Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects 
of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery 
abstract. Many observers believe the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal opinions have 
curtailed access to civil justice. But previous empirical studies looking only at Rule 12(b)(6) grant 
rates have failed to capture the full effect of these cases because they have not accounted for party 
selection—changes in party behavior that can be expected following changes in pleading 
standards. In this Note, I show how party selection can be expected to undermine the empirical 
usefulness of simple grant-rate comparisons. I then use a conceptual model of party behavior 
that allows me to derive an adjusted measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s impact and show how to 
estimate a lower bound on this measure using data from recent studies by the Federal Judicial 
Center. My empirical results suggest that, depending on the nature of the suit in question, 
Twombly and Iqbal have negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15% to 21% of cases that faced 
Rule 12(b)(6) motions in the post-Iqbal data window. Again depending on the nature of the suit, 
these figures represent between one-fourth and two-fifths of the cases that fail to reach discovery 
on at least some claims in the post-Iqbal data window.  
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Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of 
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff 
armed with nothing more than conclusions. 
 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly1 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal2 have sparked a broad debate 
concerning federal pleading standards. In the parallel-conduct antitrust 
context, Twombly overruled the Conley v. Gibson3 standard that a complaint 
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should 
be dismissed only if no set of facts exists under which the complaint’s claims 
could entitle the plaintiff to relief.4 Iqbal explicitly broadened Twombly to “all 
civil actions.”5  
A number of empirical studies have appeared concerning Twombly and 
Iqbal’s impact on motion-to-dismiss dispositions.6 Opinions seem to be split 
about the implications of these studies, with some commentators suggesting 
that the body of evidence signals a major and ominous impact of heightened 
pleading’s advent,7 especially in discrimination and civil rights cases.8 Others 
argue either that it is a good thing that Twombly and Iqbal elevate pleading 
standards, or that they do not actually change prior pleading doctrine.9 
In March 2011, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) released a detailed report 
concerning Rule 12(b)(6) practice and adjudication, hereinafter the “original 
 
1.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
2.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
3.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
4.  Id. at 45-46. 
5.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all 
civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike.” (citation omitted)). 
6.  See infra Section I.C. 
7.  See sources cited infra notes 50-54. 
8.  See sources cited infra note 53. 
9.  For scholars applauding the perceived elevation of pleading standards, see, for example, 
sources cited infra notes 55-56. For those arguing that Twombly and Iqbal did not depart 
importantly from existing doctrine, see sources cited infra note 57. 
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FJC report.”10 The FJC released another report in November 2011, hereinafter 
the “updated FJC report.”11 The authors of these FJC reports characterize their 
results as suggesting that there is little reason to believe that Twombly and Iqbal 
have importantly affected Rule 12(b)(6) adjudication.12 Others have gone 
further, like prominent Supreme Court litigator Andrew Pincus, who stated in 
congressional testimony that the original report has “proven wrong” prior 
“speculation” that Iqbal would greatly restrict civil justice access.13 Not 
surprisingly given the stakes, critics of Twombly and Iqbal have raised 
objections to the original report.14 
In this Note, I make several contributions related to the measurement of 
Twombly/Iqbal’s effects. First, I show that simply comparing the Rule 12(b)(6)  
motion-to-dismiss grant rate under Conley with the Rule 12(b)(6) motion-to-
dismiss grant rate under Twombly/Iqbal is of limited use in evaluating whether 
 
10.  JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/ 
Publications/motioniqbal.pdf. The FJC is the research and education arm of the judicial 
branch and was established pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §620 (2006). 
11.  JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS 
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ 
motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf. 
12.  See, e.g., CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at vii (“In general, there was no increase in the rate of 
grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend. There was, in particular, no increase 
in the rate of grants of motions to dismiss without leave to amend in civil rights cases and 
employment discrimination cases . . . . There was no increase from 2006 to 2010 in the rate 
at which a grant of a motion to dismiss terminated the case . . . .”). 
13.  Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will Affect 
Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) 
(statement of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Pincus%20Testimony.pdf  (“Two years ago, 
many asserted that the Court’s ruling in Ashcroft v. Iqbal . . . would dramatically restrict 
plaintiffs’ access to court and that Congressional action was needed to overturn that 
decision. That speculation has been proven wrong . . . .” (citing CECIL ET AL., supra note 
10)). 
14.  See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in 
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1941294; Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative 
Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 22-35), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883650; Lonny Hoffman, 
Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions 
To Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011). As of this writing, I am unaware of any written 
scholarly reaction to the updated FJC report. 
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pleading standards have changed. An increase in pleading standards can 
change the number of granted Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss (MTDs) 
through any or all of the following four channels: 
(i) Judicial behavior effects: More MTDs might be granted in cases that 
would have MTDs filed under either pleading regime. 
 
(ii) Defendant selection effects15: Defendants might file MTDs in cases 
that they would have answered under Conley, and some of these new 
MTDs will be granted.16 
 
(iii) Plaintiff selection effects: Plaintiffs might choose not to file some 
cases that they think will be either more expensive to litigate or less 
likely to get to discovery. Since some of the cases plaintiffs choose not 
to file as a result of increased pleading standards would have faced 
MTDs under Conley and some of those MTDs would have been 




15.  Party selection effects have a long history in the law-and-economics literature, with the 
seminal work being George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
16.  I am certainly not the first to recognize the likely existence of defendant selection following 
changes in pleading standards. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing 
Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 840 & n.70 (2010) (writing that a defense 
attorney “commits legal malpractice if he or she fails to move to dismiss with liberal 
citations to Twombly and Iqbal” and quoting “experienced litigator” Tom Goldstein as 
“predict[ing] that Iqbal will be ‘the basis for an attempt to dismiss more than 50 percent of 
all the complaints filed in federal court’” (citation omitted)); Scott Dodson, Pleading 
Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 142 (2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (“[O]ne thing is certain 
after Bell Atlantic: it will . . . encourage[] defendants to file motions to dismiss, both in the set 
of cases likely to be covered by its language, and also in the set less likely to be covered . . . .”).  
17.  As with defendant selection, I am not the first observer to note the possible presence of 
plaintiff selection. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 148 (2003) (observing that “strict pleading . . . reduces the probability of 
filing”); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 840-41; Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. 
Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. 
Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure 53 (May 2, 2011), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2011.pdf 
(“It is not possible to identify cases that would have been filed under earlier understandings 
of pleading standards but were not filed for fear of heightened pleading standards.”). 
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(iv) Settlement selection effects: The parties’ perceptions of the gains and 
costs from litigation might either create or eliminate the possibility of 
settlements where settlement surplus was either negative or positive 
under Conley.18 Thus, the number of settlements might rise or fall, and 
the number of MTDs granted might change as a result. 
A critical consequence of party selection is that differences between the 
Conley-era and post-Twombly or post-Iqbal MTD grant rates mix together two 
kinds of effects: changes in judicial behavior among cases that would have 
MTDs filed under either pleading regime, and selection-induced compositional 
differences in the sets of cases that actually do face MTDs under the Conley and 
Twombly/Iqbal regimes. Previous empirical studies have not taken account of 
such potentially important changes in behavior. These studies typically 
subtract the observed MTD grant rate under Conley from the observed MTD 
grant rate under Twombly/Iqbal. But as I argue in Part IV, any observed 
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes is consistent with large, small, 
or even zero judicial behavior effects. Thus, the existing empirical literature 
cannot settle disagreements over the effects of switching from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal. 
My second contribution relates to the fact that changes in pleading 
standards affect litigants in ways other than through changes in judicial 
behavior. For example, the discussion of defendant selection above explains 
that if defendants file additional MTDs after a switch to the Twombly/Iqbal 
pleading standard, more MTDs likely will be granted as a result. This effect 
will harm the plaintiffs in these cases, in that the switch causes these cases not 
to reach discovery. Conversely, the switch  in pleading standards will help 
defendants, for the same reason. We should want to measure such effects. 
In Part V, I derive a measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s impact among a particular 
set of cases, those in which MTDs are actually filed under Twombly/Iqbal.19 
 
18.  I discuss these issues, and the concept of settlement surplus, in detail in Part III. 
19.  To understand why my estimates relate to this particular set of cases requires one to 
understand the methodological discussion in Parts II-V, which is too much to pithily 
explain here. For the moment, though, the key aspect of the set of cases that have MTDs 
filed against them under Twombly/Iqbal is that this set’s composition is fixed: it does not 
vary with the pleading regime that is actually in place at any given moment. By contrast, it 
does not make sense to speak of the impact of Twombly/Iqbal among sets of cases whose 
composition does vary with the pleading regime. For example, consider three interesting-
sounding sets of cases: “cases in which a motion to dismiss is filed,” “cases in which a 
motion to dismiss is granted,” or “all filed cases.” Party selection can cause the composition 
of all three of these sets to change when the pleading regime changes. As a result there is no 
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Among these cases, switching to heightened pleading causes two types of 
effects. First, there are discovery-prevented cases—those that would reach 
discovery under Conley but do not as a result of switching to Twombly/Iqbal. 
Second, there are settlement-prevented cases—those that would be settled under 
Conley but that, because of the switch to Twombly/Iqbal, plaintiffs will file and 
defendants will challenge via successful MTDs. Even though these settlement-
prevented cases would not reach discovery under either pleading regime, 
plaintiffs in these cases are worse off as a result of switching from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal, since they do not receive a settlement under Twombly/Iqbal and 
must also litigate MTDs that they wind up losing. 
Taken together, discovery-prevented cases and settlement-prevented cases 
constitute the set of what I call “negatively affected cases,” because these are 
cases whose disposition leads to worse results for the plaintiffs who bring 
suit.20 The negatively affected share is the ratio of (i) the number of negatively 
affected cases to (ii) the number of cases that face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal. 
For selection-related reasons that I explain in Part V, the negatively affected 
share generally cannot be calculated with real-world data. However, I show 
how to use available data to measure a lower bound on it.21 This is an 
important contribution, because it allows me to provide meaningful empirical 
evidence concerning the effects on the parties of switching pleading regimes, 
among cases that have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. 
My final contribution comes in Part VI, where I use data from the FJC’s 
two reports to estimate this lower bound separately among three categories of 
cases. My results suggest that switching pleading standards affected plaintiffs 
negatively in a sizable share of those cases that faced MTDs in the Iqbal period. 
For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, switching from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15.4% and at least 18.1% 
of cases, respectively, that faced MTDs in the Iqbal period.22 Among cases not 
 
meaningful way to measure “the” impact of switching pleading regimes on such sets of 
cases. 
20.  I do not mean to take sides in any normative arguments by using the adverb “negatively.” 
One might as easily refer to the underlying concept as “positively affected cases,” given that 
a switch in pleading regimes makes defendants better off in discovery- and settlement-
prevented cases. Twombly and Iqbal do raise important normative questions, of course; I 
discuss these briefly in Parts I and VII.  
21.  A lower bound on one function’s value—in this case, the negatively affected share—is 
another function with the property that the second function never takes on a value greater 
than the value taken on by the first function. 
22.  In the October 23, 2011, draft version of this paper, Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to 
Discovery? Conceptual Challenges in and Empirical Results for Assessing the Effects of 
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involving civil rights, employment discrimination, or financial instruments, 
Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected at least 21.5% of plaintiffs facing MTDs in 
the Iqbal study period.23 These results tell us that Twombly/Iqbal negatively 
affected a sizable share of those plaintiffs who actually faced MTDs in the  
post-Iqbal period that the FJC studies.24 
My findings raise important policy questions. Defenders of Twombly and 
Iqbal cite high discovery costs as a reason to raise the pleading bar. Thus, a first 
question is whether discovery-prevented cases (those negatively affected cases 
that would have reached discovery under Conley but do not under 
Twombly/Iqbal) are the cases for which discovery is especially expensive. Critics 
of Twombly and Iqbal argue that the decisions create a Catch-22: in order to 
meet heightened pleading standards, plaintiffs must already have information 
that in at least some cases may be accessible only via discovery. And yet 
Twombly and Iqbal allow the plaintiff access to discovery only if she has already 
constructed a complaint with that information. Thus, a second question is 
whether Twombly and Iqbal disproportionately affect the types of hard-to-plead 
cases for which this Catch-22 is most salient. And what if the answers to both 
of these questions are yes? While these questions are beyond my ability to 
answer in this Note, they frame an agenda for future research concerning 
pleading standards. 
This Note proceeds as follows. In Part I, I briefly discuss Twombly and Iqbal 
and the previous empirical literature, and I give an overview of the current 
findings on post-Twombly/Iqbal MTD grant rates. In Part II, I lay down some 
methodological bricks that form the foundation of the substantive results that 
follow. In Part III, I present an economic model of pre-discovery litigation. I 
first discuss a stripped-down economic model of litigation in which procedure 
plays essentially no role. I then augment this model so that it is detailed 
 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery (Oct. 23, 2011) (on file with author), I reported 
slightly different effect sizes. I completed that draft before the updated FJC report was 
released. The updated report allowed me to drop certain assumptions regarding re-filing 
behavior following grants with leave to amend, which is the primary source of the difference 
in estimates. 
23.  I exclude financial-instruments cases because there is good reason to believe that trends 
involving them are due at least in part to the financial crisis. 
24.  In Appendix B, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach 
_appendix_b.pdf I derive formulas for and estimate standard errors for my lower bound on 
the negatively affected share. Results show that estimates are statistically significant at 
conventional levels for all three nature-of-suit categories that I consider.  
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enough to yield several qualitative predictions concerning party selection 
effects, which will be useful in succeeding Parts of this Note.25 
In Part IV, I show that in the presence of party selection, observed MTD 
grant rates might rise, fall, or stay the same, even when there are substantial 
judicial behavior effects among cases that would face MTDs under either 
pleading regime. An implication of this finding is that nothing of substance can 
be learned, without more data, from differences in grant rates across pleading 
regimes Further, I argue in this Part that even if they could be measured 
correctly, judicial behavior effects are themselves a truncated measure of the 
effects of changes in pleading standards, because they fail to capture important 
direct effects of party selection. 
In Part V, I introduce my alternative measure, the negatively affected share 
discussed above. Unfortunately, unless we assume that there is no party 
selection, this measure cannot be calculated using actual data. However, I show 
that a lower bound for the negatively affected share can be established using 
real-world data that are actually available. 
In Part VI, I present my empirical estimates. In Part VII, I briefly discuss 
future questions deserving empirical study. I then conclude. 
 
i .  twombly ,  iqbal ,  and access to discovery  
In Section I.A, I begin by discussing doctrinal issues related to Twombly 
and Iqbal. In Section I.B, I then argue that limiting access to discovery played a 
critical role in the Supreme Court’s opinions in these cases. I also discuss 
critics’ concerns that Twombly and Iqbal will harm plaintiffs. Finally, I canvass 
previous empirical studies in Section I.C, including the FJC reports. 
 
25.  Numerous scholars writing in the law-and-economics tradition have constructed economic 
models of litigation. Examples besides Priest & Klein, supra note 15, include Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats To Sue, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD.1 (1996); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1997); 
Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options 
Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be 
Dismissed? The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standards, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 39 (2008); and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). 
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A. Pleading Standards: Rule 8(a), Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal 
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part 
that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . (2) a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”26 
This rule plays a critical role in the adjudication of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim: failure to make a “short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” is the basis for 
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Before Twombly, the leading Supreme Court case interpreting this standard 
was 1957’s Conley v. Gibson, which held that “a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”27 While there has been some debate as to the faithfulness with 
which courts honored Conley’s no-set-of-facts standard,28 there is no question 
that Conley and the no-set-of-facts standard were the Court’s target in 
Twombly. 
Twombly was a putative class-action antitrust case filed by subscribers 
against incumbent local phone carriers, including Bell Atlantic. The plaintiffs 
contended that the carriers had violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
by engaging in a conspiracy both to hobble competition and not to enter each 
other’s markets following the deregulation of these markets by the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.29 To prove a Sherman Act section 1 violation, 
a plaintiff must establish that there was a “contract, combination . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.”30 But in their complaint, the plaintiffs offered 
no direct reason to believe that such an agreement existed. Instead, they relied 
on the existence of the carriers’ parallel conduct—the carriers’ simultaneous 
failure to enter each other’s pre-1996 markets—and simply alleged, “upon 
information and belief,” the existence of a “contract, combination or 
 
26.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
27.  Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). 
28.  See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007) (stating that “Conley’s ‘no 
set of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away” and that it has 
“puzzl[ed] the profession for 50 years”); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice 
Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003). 
29.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51. 
30.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
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conspiracy.”31 In his opinion for the Twombly Court, Justice Souter wrote that 
the carriers’ behavior was “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line 
with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally 
prompted by common perceptions of the market.”32 Further, the Court found 
that the averment of an agreement in the plaintiffs’ complaint was conclusory 
and so was not entitled to the usual benefit of construction that courts 
considering a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD owe to plaintiffs’ factual allegations at the 
pleading stage.33 
Having thus disregarded the plaintiffs’ allegation of illegal agreement, the 
Twombly Court construed the complaint as alleging nothing more than parallel 
conduct.34 Because existing Supreme Court precedent held that parallel 
conduct is not per se illegal without additional reason to suspect the existence 
of an illegal agreement,35 the Twombly Court concluded: 
  The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting 
(not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold 
requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the “plain statement” possess enough 
heft to “sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A statement of 
parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs 
something suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; 
without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the 
minds, an account of a defendant’s commercial efforts stays in neutral 
territory.36 
Lest there be any doubt as to Justice Souter’s distinction between 
“possibility” and “plausibility,” he stated explicitly that “Conley’s ‘no set of 
facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long 
enough. . . . [A]fter puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous 
 
31.  Complaint at ¶ 51, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02 
CIV. 10220), 2003 WL 25629874 (“Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that 
Defendants have entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive 
entry . . . and have agreed not to compete with one another and otherwise allocated 
customers and markets to one another.”). 
32.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
33.  Id. at 557. 
34.  Id. 
35.  See id. at 553 (“‘[T]he crucial question’ is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct 
‘stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement’ . . . .” (quoting Theatre Enter., 
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954))). 
36.  Id. at 557. 
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observation has earned its retirement.”37 What was not clear, though, was 
whether Twombly applied only to antitrust cases—or even just parallel-conduct 
cases—or whether its reach was transsubstantive. The logic of the Court’s 
argument can easily be read to involve the substantive details of antitrust law, 
and some commentators continue to advocate reading Twombly that way even 
after Iqbal.38 
Enter Ashcroft v. Iqbal.39 The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was held in a maximum 
security “Special Housing Unit” as part of the U.S. government’s post-September 
11 policy of confining persons “of high interest” in such facilities.40 Alleging he 
was beaten and otherwise mistreated during his detention,41 Iqbal filed a Bivens 
action against multiple parties, including FBI Director Robert Mueller and 
then-Attorney General John Ashcroft.42 As Justice Kennedy characterized it in 
his opinion for the Court, Iqbal’s complaint alleged that Mueller and Ashcroft 
had “adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected Iqbal to harsh 
conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national 
origin.”43 Justice Kennedy wrote that these aspects of the instant complaint 
were “bare assertions, much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, [that] 
amount[ed] to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a 
constitutional discrimination claim.”44 
Justice Kennedy then went on to evaluate whether the claims he labeled 
conclusory were plausible. He noted that the attacks of September 11 were 
carried out by nineteen Arab Muslims who belonged to al Qaeda, whose 
membership was largely Arab Muslim.45 Thus, the Court opined: “It should 
come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest 
and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would 
 
37.  Id. at 562-63. 
38.  For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Alvin K. Klevorick & Issa B. Kohler-Hausmann, 
The Plausibility of Twombly: Proving Horizontal Agreements After Twombly, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge ed., forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 201) (on file with author). 
39.  129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
40.  First Amended Complaint at 2-3, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 01809, 2005 WL 
2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).  
41.  Id. at 19, 31-33. 
42.  Id. at 4-5. 
43.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942. 
44.  Id. at 1951 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 
45.  Id. 
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produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the 
purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”46 Indeed,  
the Court continued, “[a]s between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for 
the arrests and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to 
infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.”47 
The Iqbal Court’s guidance concerning what qualifies as plausible is less 
than rigorous: “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to 
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”48 Of course, one person’s 
common sense might be another’s close-mindedness. Even as five Justices 
might not have found “purposeful, invidious discrimination” a plausible 
explanation for Javaid Iqbal’s treatment, it is not difficult to imagine that 
others might disagree.49 Whatever Conley’s drawbacks, the “no set of facts” 
standard is, on its face, at least objective: either it would be possible to adduce 
facts entitling a plaintiff to relief based on a complaint’s allegations or it would 
not be. By contrast, the subjective nature of “experience and common sense” is 
self-evident. 
The Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have faced a fusillade of 
criticism. Arthur Miller has written that the cases “mark[] a continued retreat 
from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and 
equality of litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated 
 
46.  Id. Note that, according to the Second Circuit, “Iqbal is a Muslim and a Pakistani, but not 
an Arab.” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 148 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007). 
47.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567). The Iqbal 
Court also held that Iqbal would need to establish more than just the unconstitutionality of 
his arrest, since “[his] complaint challenges neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his 
initial detention.” Id. at 1952. Instead, his complaint rested on the allegation that detainees 
categorized as being “of high interest” were confined in the Administrative Maximum 
Special Housing Unit because of their race, religion, or national origin. Id. at 1952. The 
Court then determined that Iqbal’s complaint “does not contain any factual allegation 
sufficient to plausibly suggest [the] discriminatory state of mind” on the part of Ashcroft 
and Mueller that would be necessary to meet the Court’s reading of Rule 8(a) as to the 
policy that led to Iqbal’s confinement in the unit. Id. at 1952. 
48.  Id. at 1950. 
49.  See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 227 (2010) 
(“[T]he allegation that the detainees sent to the abusive maximum security prison unit were 
disproportionately Arab and Muslim, combined with the allegations of actual incidents of 
guards’ express prejudice alleged in the complaint, would seem to make out a more-than-
plausible prima facie case that the underlying policy designed and implemented by Ashcroft 
and Mueller targeted Arab and Muslim men for confinement under the harsh conditions of 
the maximum security prison.”). 
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wealth.”50 Characterizing Twombly and Iqbal’s results as “Pleading Left 
Bleeding,” Kevin Clermont and Stephen Yeazell argue that “[b]y inventing a 
new and foggy test for the threshold stage of every lawsuit, [Twombly and 
Iqbal] have destabilized the entire system of civil litigation.”51 Judge Colleen 
McMahon of the Southern District of New York wrote after Twombly that “no 
one quite understands what the case holds. . . . We district court judges 
suddenly and unexpectedly find ourselves puzzled over something we thought 
we knew how to do with our eyes closed: dispose of a motion to dismiss a case 
for failure to state a claim.”52 And a number of commentators have expressed 
special concern about Twombly and Iqbal’s effects on civil rights claimants.53 
Bills were introduced in both houses of Congress in 2009 with the aim of 
overruling Twombly and Iqbal, though both stalled.54 
Other observers have welcomed Twombly and Iqbal. For example, Mark 
Herrmann and James Beck write that “out-of-control litigation prompted the 
Supreme Court in Twombly to adjust the threshold pleading requirements for 
unleashing the legal process.”55 On the basis of a mathematical model, Keith 
Hylton advocates “rigorous assessment at the pleading stage,” which “provides 
 
50.  Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010). 
51.  Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 16, at 823. 
52.  Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 852-53 (2008). 
53.  See, e.g., Joshua Civin & Debo P. Adegbile, Restoring Access to Justice: The Impact of Iqbal and 
Twombly on Federal Civil Rights Litigation, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 2 (2010), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Civin_Adegbile_Iqbal_Twombly.pdf (expressing 
fear that Twombly and Iqbal might “create an undesirable safe harbor that effectively places 
some defendants beyond the reach of civil rights laws”); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of 
Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119, 159 (2011) (“[C]ases in which state of mind plays a 
large role or in which there are large information asymmetries, such as civil rights, 
constitutional, and employment discrimination cases, are most likely to be vulnerable to 
accusations of thin pleading.”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil 
Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519 (2010) (“[T]he greatest impact of this change in the landscape of 
federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and employment discrimination cases 
from federal courts in disproportionate numbers.”). 
54.  See Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access to 
Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009). 
55.  Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should 
Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 145 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (opening statement of 
Herrmann and Beck). 
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an economic rationale for the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic v. 
Twombly, and suggests that it may have a broader application than to the 
circumstances of that case.”56 Still others have argued that Twombly and Iqbal 
actually change relatively little in the pleading system.57 Finally, some 
commentators have read the two cases as having important differences, with 
Twombly having either changed little or made beneficial changes, by contrast to 
a perceived negative effect of Iqbal.58 
B. The Crucial Role of Discovery Access in Twombly and Iqbal  
The underlying issue animating not only the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal, but also the controversy surrounding them, is discovery 
access. When discovery costs are asymmetrically high for defendants, a 
plaintiff’s ability to get through the answer/MTD stage can be a powerful club. 
Liberal pleading rules may have an in terrorem effect on defendants in these 
cases, possibly inducing more, and more one-sided, settlements. The Supreme 
Court’s opinions in both Twombly and Iqbal take note of this point; the 
opinions make repeated and extensive references to the burden of discovery 
 
56.  Hylton, supra note 25, at 42. 
57.  See, e.g., Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will 
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-6-29%20Pincus%20Testimony.pdf (statement 
of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP); Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Decisions in 
Twombly and Iqbal: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11 (2009), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Garre%20Testimony.pdf (statement 
of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham & Watkins LLP, and former Solicitor Gen. of the 
United States) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal . . . are firmly 
grounded in decades of prior precedent at both the Supreme Court and federal appellate 
court level . . . .”); Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 31 
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-36_53090.pdf 
(statement of Gregory C. Katsas, former Assistant Att’y Gen.) (“Twombly and Iqbal simply 
follow and apply settled propositions of black-letter law . . . .”); Daniel R. Karon, “‘Twas 
Three Years After Twombly and All Through the Bar, Not a Plaintiff Was Troubled from Near or 
from Far”—The Unremarkable Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Re-Expressed Pleading 
Standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 571, 572 (2010) (“Twombly is 
remarkable only for its unremarkability . . . .”). 
58.  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (“Iqbal applies a thick screening model that 
aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a thin screening 
model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits. The thick screening model is highly 
problematic on policy grounds . . . .”). 
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borne by large corporations (as in Twombly) or government officials (as in 
Iqbal).59 
Citing a 1989 law review essay by Judge Frank Easterbrook,60 Justice 
Souter argues in Twombly that not all “groundless” claims can “be weeded out 
early in the discovery process through careful case management  . . . given the 
common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery 
abuse has been on the modest side.”61 Moreover, Justice Souter argues, 
summary judgment is too late in the game for weak claims to be eliminated, 
because “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to 
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.”62 Still other text 
from Twombly highlights the Court’s specific concern about the expense 
discovery brings along in complex antitrust cases: 
  Probably, then, it is only by taking care to require allegations that 
reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the 
potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no reasonably 
founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence 
to support a § 1 claim.63  
The concern about discovery burdens appears in Iqbal too, with Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court repeatedly stressing the role of discovery. 
Justice Kennedy places special emphasis on the Court’s “rejection of the 
careful-case-management approach” in cases involving qualified immunity, 
whose “basic thrust . . . is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, 
including avoidance of disruptive discovery.”64 Finally, the epigraph of this Note 
leaves no doubt as to the importance Justice Kennedy assigns to limiting 
 
59.  Andrew Blair-Stanek argues that one can view a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as “effectively just 
the denial of discovery, followed by summary judgment based solely on the facts alleged in 
the complaint.” Andrew Blair-Stanek, Twombly Is the Logical Extension of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge Test to Discovery, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1, 36 (2010). Blair-Stanek notes that denial of 
discovery finds a basis in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), id., which allows a court to limit discovery if 
it finds that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
60.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989). 
61.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (emphasis added and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
62.  Id. (emphasis added). 
63.  Id. (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted). 
64.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (emphasis added and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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discovery in Iqbal. Despite its generosity and departure from “hyper-technical 
 . . . code-pleading,” Justice Kennedy writes, “Rule 8 . . . does not unlock the 
doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”65 
C. Previous Empirical Literature  
I am aware of nine studies by other authors that attempt a quantitative 
assessment of how MTD grant rates changed after Twombly or Iqbal.66 Two of 
these are the FJC reports, which I will discuss momentarily. Four of the studies 
consider only data from the pre-Iqbal period, so that they compare MTD grant 
rates in the Conley era with MTD grant rates in the period between Twombly 
and Iqbal. These studies are Kendall W. Hannon’s student note;67 University 
of South Carolina School of Law Professor Joseph A. Seiner’s separate studies 
of employment discrimination68 and of ADA cases;69 and a paper by University 
of Chicago Law School Professor William Hubbard that is unpublished as of 
 
65.  Id. at 1950 (emphasis added). 
66.  In addition, I am working on a paper that will link a formal, game-theoretic model of  
pre-discovery litigation to empirical work similar to the results I report in Part VI. As of this 
writing, a very rough draft is available as Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in Motion: Measuring 
and Estimating the Effects of Heightened Pleading (Nov. 3, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract =1884505. 
67.  Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2008). Because it was 
written before Iqbal, Hannon’s study provides limited guidance, though its sample 
construction has the virtue of being less likely than most other studies to suffer from party 
selection effects since “the vast majority of cases in this study involved a complaint that was 
filed before the Twombly decision,” id. at 1831, and “the majority of the 12(b)(6) motions in 
the study set were brought before Twombly,” id. Thus, Hannon argues that his sample 
should be insulated from the sorts of selection effects on which I focus in this Note. Id. 
68.  Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment 
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011. 
69.  Joseph A. Seiner, Pleading Disability, 51 B.C. L. REV. 95 (2010). Seiner notes that the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the set of people 
covered by the ADA. Id. at 108 (stating that the Act “explicitly seek[s] to ‘reinstat[e] a broad 
scope of protection’” under the ADA (quoting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325, § 2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008))). As a consequence, one might expect to 
see more ADA-related suits filed. Supplemental evidence provided to me by Joe Cecil of the 
FJC shows that this is indeed the case. See infra note 167. Since the Amendments took effect 
between Twombly and Iqbal, the composition of ADA cases may have changed for reasons 
unrelated to changes in pleading doctrine. Thus, even in the absence of party selection, I do 
not believe that Seiner’s Pleading Disability would be a reliable guide to the effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on discovery access, and I will not discuss it further. 
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this writing.70 The other three papers include two by St. Thomas University 
School of Law Professor Patricia Hatamyar Moore—an initial one that includes 
a relatively small post-Iqbal sample71 and a follow-up study with a larger 
sample of post-Iqbal cases72—and another by Albany Law School Professor 
Raymond Brescia.73 
All seven of these studies use data collected via searches of either Lexis’s 
federal cases combined database (in the case of Brescia’s paper74) or one of 
Westlaw’s case databases (for the other six studies75). The details vary 
somewhat across studies, but the basic approach is to search case databases for 
judicial opinions that contain “Conley,” “Twombly,” or “Iqbal,” as appropriate 
depending on the time period of interest, together with terms indicating that 
the opinion concerned the adjudication of a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD. These studies 
typically include cases from a search window of between one and two years 
before Twombly, between Twombly and Iqbal, and after Iqbal. 
It is difficult to do justice to seven studies that used overlapping but 
distinct data-gathering and empirical methodologies. However, as a rough 
approximation, it is possible to draw a few basic general conclusions from these 
studies: 
 
70.  William H.J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 575, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883831. Like Hannon, see supra note 67, Hubbard uses 
only cases filed before Twombly was decided in order to prevent selection related to  
case-filing decisions from driving his results. See Hubbard, supra, at 31. In addition to his 
empirical work, Hubbard also presents an interesting mathematical model of selection, 
which he states “generates new predictions about the prevalence and success rates of 
motions to dismiss . . . [that] are borne out empirically.” Id. However, Hubbard does not 
prove that his model generates the predictions that he attributes to it, so it is not clear 
whether they are model predictions or simply conjectures. 
71.  Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?,  
59 AM. U. L. REV. 553 (2010). 
72.  Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14. 
73.  Brescia, supra note 14. Brescia makes the interesting point that there should not be judicial 
behavior effects of Twombly and Iqbal in some cases with Rule 12(b)(6) motions, since not 
all such motions will involve problems with plausibility. Id. at 5. Nonetheless, he finds that 
“courts rarely found that a case should be dismissed because a judge considered there to be a 
more plausible, and entirely legal, basis for the complained of conduct,” which is the 
doctrinal cornerstone of Twombly and Iqbal’s change to pleading standards. Id. at 7. 
74.  Brescia, supra note 14, at 31-32 n.98. 
75.  See Hannon, supra note 67, at 1830; Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 584-85, nn.200, 202; 
Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 5, nn.25-27; Hubbard, supra note 70, at 28; Seiner, supra 
note 68, at 1028, nn.128, 129; Seiner, supra note 69, at 116-17, nn.180, 185. 
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 They tend to find relatively little difference in MTD grant rates 
across their pre-Twombly and post-Twombly/pre-Iqbal periods.76 
 They tend to find differences in the MTD grant or denial rate that 
range between zero and ten percentage points across their Conley 
and post-Iqbal periods,77 with larger differences for cases involving 
civil rights of one type or another.78767778 
 They find either small or no changes in the rate at which MTDs are 
granted without leave for the plaintiff to amend her complaint, and 
sizable increases in the rate they are granted with leave to amend.79 
As the original FJC report points out, coverage in case databases like 
Westlaw and Lexis is incomplete, because not all decisions are included in 
these databases.80 In addition, the report notes, “whether an order was granted 
or denied may be related to its likelihood of publication.”81 Thus, one concern 
about the aforementioned studies is that, party selection issues aside, their 
samples may not represent the set of all cases that actually have MTDs filed or 
adjudicated in either the Conley or Twombly/Iqbal periods. 
 
76.  See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 14, at 29-30; Hannon, supra note 67, at 1836; Hatamyar, supra 
note 71, at 597-99; Hubbard, supra note 70, at 28. 
77.  See, e.g., Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 7-8 (finding that the MTD denial rate “fell from 
26% under Conley to . . . 17% under Iqbal”). 
78.  For example, in her earlier paper, Hatamyar Moore finds that grant rates for MTDs in cases 
she codes as involving constitutional civil rights rose from 50% under Conley to 55% under 
Twombly to 60% under Iqbal. Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 556. Her later paper shows a much 
larger Conley-Iqbal difference, roughly twenty-three percentage points, when she follows the 
FJC’s methodology and excludes cases with pro se plaintiffs, but her samples in this 
comparison include just sixty-two cases under Conley and fifty-three post-Iqbal, so it is 
unclear what to make of this result. Hatamyar Moore, supra note 14, at 11-12. 
79.  See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 14, at 36-37; Hatamyar, supra note 71, at 598 tbl.1; Hatamyar 
Moore, supra note 14, at 7 (showing that the rate at which MTDs are granted without leave 
to amend was 40% in both her Conley and Iqbal samples but indicating “[t]he percentage of 
12(b)(6) motions granted in full with leave to amend increased from 6% under Conley to . . . 
21% under Iqbal”). 
80.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 37 & n.47. 
81.  Id. After searching Westlaw’s “allfeds” database for thirty to forty orders that appear in the 
FJC’s sample for each of three districts, Cecil et al. were able to match 87% of them for 
the Eastern District of Arkansas and 82% for the District of Colorado, but only 18% for the 
District of Kansas. Id. How much of the differences between results in the FJC report and 
those in the studies discussed supra are due to such case-coverage differences is an open 
question. Hatamyar Moore does write that when she tries to replicate the FJC’s sample 
inclusion criteria, her “findings are broadly consistent with the FJC’s.” Hatamyar Moore, 
supra note 14, at 3. 
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A second concern is that it is unclear how to combine results involving 
MTD grants with and without leave to amend. If plaintiffs never file amended 
complaints (or defendants always challenge amended complaints again and 
win grants without leave to amend), then the best way to measure MTD grant 
rates would be to add together grants with and without leave to amend. On the 
other hand, if plaintiffs always file amended complaints, and if none of these is 
ever dismissed with prejudice, then the best way to measure MTD grant rates 
would be to use only grants without leave to amend. One would expect—and 
the updated FJC report confirms, as I discuss below—that the reality lies 
somewhere between these extremes. Even if we could be confident there were 
no party selection, then, it would not be clear how we should use the grant-rate 
figures in the studies discussed above. This is especially problematic since 
trends in the rates at which MTDs were granted with and without leave to 
amend have differed noticeably.82 
I turn now to the FJC reports. These reports combine the fruits of two 
distinct data-gathering efforts, which I will refer to as the filing data set and 
the grants data set. Both studies involve cases originally filed in, or removed 
from state courts to, twenty-three federal district courts that “account for 51% 
of all federal civil cases filed” in 2009.83 Rather than use legal reference 
databases to find cases in which MTDs are adjudicated as in the studies 
discussed above, Cecil and his coauthors searched the FJC’s database of civil 
case docket sheets for codes that indicate filing of MTDs and orders resolving 
them.84 They then used computer algorithms to search associated electronic 
documents for phrases that indicated that the MTD in question involved Rule 
12(b)(6).85 
The filing data set includes all cases that meet the FJC’s inclusion criteria86 
and were filed between October 1, 2005, and June 30, 2006 (what I will call the 
 
82.  See supra text accompanying note 79. 
83.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 5. These courts consist of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia as well as, in general, “the 2 districts in each of the 11 circuits with the 
largest number of civil cases filed in 2009,” though in some circuits the FJC instead was 
forced to use “the court in the circuit with the next greatest number of civil filings.” Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  The FJC excluded cases involving prisoners and pro se plaintiffs due to “the distinctive 
characteristics and procedural requirements of such litigation, and because they were 
concentrated in only 4 of the 23 districts” the FJC studied. Id. at 6 n.10. The FJC also 
excluded orders resolving motions that responded to counterclaims and affirmative 
defenses. Id. at 6. 
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Conley period), or October 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010 (what I will call the Iqbal 
period).87 Filings of cases involving financial instruments more than tripled, 
and civil rights filings grew 18%,88 but the number of cases filed changed little 
in the other categories the FJC considered.89 The FJC’s civil rights category 
excludes Title VII employment cases, which the FJC considers separately.90 
However, the civil rights category does include ADA cases.91 Given the 
liberalization of ADA coverage arising from the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008,92 changes in case and MTD filings in the FJC’s civil rights category most 
likely mix together effects of Twombly and Iqbal and effects of the ADA 
Amendments.93 
Among filed cases, the rate at which defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs 
increased from 4.0% to 6.2% between the early and later periods.94 This is a 
substantial change in filing rates: a 2.2 percentage-point increase in the MTD 
filing rate constitutes a 55% increase from the Conley-period filing rate of 4.0%. 
Thus, Twombly and Iqbal were accompanied by a substantively large increase in 
the rate at which defendants filed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs. 
Next, I turn to the original FJC report’s grants data set, which includes 
cases for which a judicial order was entered either between January 2006 and 
June 2006 (the Conley period), or between January 2010 and June 2010 (the 
Iqbal period).95 There were 700 such orders in the Conley sample and 1221 in 
 
87.  When referring to the FJC reports, I use phrase “Iqbal period,” since the FJC did not collect 
data covering the post-Twombly, pre-Iqbal period. Elsewhere I use variants of “the 
Twombly/Iqbal period,” since both Twombly and Iqbal potentially raised pleading standards. 
88.  Table 1 of the original FJC report shows that there were 1524 cases involving financial 
instruments in the FJC’s early period and 4790 in its later period; the figures for civil rights 
cases were 4214 and 4976, respectively. Id. at 9 tbl.1. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 39-40 tbl.B-2. 
91.  Id. 
92.  See supra note 69. 
93.  In my own empirical work using the FJC’s data in Part VI, I exclude all ADA cases. I am able 
to do this only because of the generous provision of supplemental tables by Joe Cecil, lead 
author of the FJC reports. 
94.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9-11. While each of the FJC reports contains results from 
multivariate models that account for various case characteristics, I will focus my discussion 
on the simple differences between the pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal periods studied; the 
multivariate results are broadly consistent with the simpler differences in grant rates. 
95.  Id. at 5. 
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the Iqbal sample.96 The FJC used recent graduates from the University of 
Oklahoma College of Law to code these orders not only for the judge’s action, 
but also for a variety of factors, including whether the challenged complaint 
had been amended.97 Coders “indicated whether a motion was denied, was 
granted as to all relief requested by the motion, or was granted as to some but 
not all of the relief requested by the motion.”98 
When the court granted relief, the FJC “also coded whether the plaintiff 
was allowed to amend the complaint, and whether the motion eliminated only 
some claims or all claims of one or more plaintiffs.”99 It is thus important to 
remember that the FJC’s grant data concern claims rather than cases, since 
some of a complaint’s claims might survive to discovery even as others will not. 
Thus, my results using the FJC data should be interpreted as telling us about 
the share of cases in which at least some claims are dismissed as a result of 
Twombly and Iqbal. 
The FJC found that the share of orders that denied in full a Rule 12(b)(6) 
MTD fell from 34.1% to 25.0%; put differently, the share of orders that granted 
some or all relief sought by defendants increased from 65.9% to 75.0%.100 
These more favorable results for defendants are more than fully explained by 
the (statistically significant) increase in the share of MTD orders that were 
granted with leave to amend: this share rose more than 14%, from 20.9% to 
35.3% (a statistically significant increase),101 while the share granted without 
leave to amend actually fell about five percentage points, from 45.0% to 
39.7%.102 
For employment discrimination cases, the share of MTDs that were 
granted as to some or all claims challenged increased from 67.4% to 70.6%, 
with the difference being statistically insignificant.103 For civil rights cases, the 
 
96.  Id. at 14 (author’s calculations from tbl.4). 
97.  Id. at 41. 
98.  Id. at 5. 
99.  Id. Observe that even a grant in full need not eliminate all claims against a defendant, or 
even all of a particular plaintiff’s claims against that defendant, since the defendant might 
challenge only some claims. 
100.  Id. at 14 tbl.4. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. 
103.  Id. 
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grant rate rose from 70.3% to 78.0%.104 As with other cases, the increase in the 
share of MTDs granted is composed of a large increase in the share granted 
with leave to amend and a smaller drop in the share granted without leave to 
amend.105 Results for MTD orders are very different for financial instrument 
cases compared with others. 
In November 2011, the FJC released its updated report, which conducted 
further collection and analysis of cases represented in the original report’s 
grants data set.106 Unlike the initial report, which coded only the specific order 
found via the FJC’s search of its database, the updated report follows all cases 
included in the original grants study through September 1, 2011.107 Plaintiffs 
submitted one or more amended complaints in 347 cases, just under two-thirds 
of the 543 cases in the original report’s grants study that had MTDs granted 
with leave to amend.108 Defendants filed renewed Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs in 209 
of these 347 cases, roughly 60%.109 All but eighty of these MTDs were resolved 
within the FJC’s follow-up period.110 
For my purposes, the most important aspect of the updated report concerns 
its results on whether MTD movants (presumably defendants) or respondents 
(presumably plaintiffs) prevail at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage after the MTD filing 
that the FJC considered in its original report’s grant study. By the FJC’s 
definition, plaintiffs prevail when MTDs are denied, and defendants prevail 
when MTDs are granted without leave to amend as to all claims. But when the 
 
104.  The report’s table 4 has a typographical error, transposing the last two digits of the actual 
pre-Twombly rate so that it reads 27.9%; I calculated a rate of 29.7% by dividing the number 
of denied civil rights MTDs, 51, by the corresponding total number of MTDs considered, 
172, which yields 29.7%. See id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 11. 
107.  In personal communication, lead author Joe Cecil informed me that this date, which does 
not appear in the updated report, was the end of the follow-up period. E-mail from Joe 
Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report, to author (Dec. 7, 2011, 11:18 AM EST) (on file with 
author). The updated report also adds the caveat that, as a result of “idiosyncratic coding 
practices by court staff” in some districts, the authors missed some orders in constructing 
the sample used in both the original and updated reports; however, the updated report 
states that the authors “presently have no reason to believe that inclusion of the missing 
orders will change the findings of our study of outcomes of motions” and promises a 
reanalysis once missing orders are located. CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 1-2. 
108.  Id. at 3. 
109.  Id. 
110.  See id. 
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court grants an MTD with leave to amend, the plaintiff has the option to file an 
amended complaint, so either party might ultimately prevail. 
In the updated report, the FJC coded the movant as prevailing in a case 
whose MTD had been granted with leave to amend if “the court granted the 
last motion to dismiss in whole or in part and no opportunity to amend the 
complaint remained. This included all cases in which the motion was granted 
with leave to amend, but no amended complaint was submitted during the 
time allowed.”111 The FJC coded the respondent in such a case as prevailing if 
“the last motion to dismiss was denied, or . . . the respondent submitted an 
amended complaint and the movant chose not to respond with an additional 
motion to dismiss.”112 The FJC excluded from consideration eighty cases in 
which the chain of events following the filing of the initial MTD the FJC 
considered had yet to terminate in one of these ways.113 
Neither movants nor respondents bat a thousand among cases that have 
MTDs granted with leave to amend. The FJC report reveals that in all cases 
considered together, movants ultimately prevailed in 56.4% of cases in the 
Conley sample.114 This figure lies roughly midway between the 45.0% that have 
MTDs granted without leave to amend115 and the 65.9% that have MTDs 
granted either with or without leave to amend.116 The analogous figures for the 
FJC’s Iqbal sample show that movants ultimately prevail in 62.7% of MTDs,117 
while 39.7% of MTDs are granted without leave to amend118 and 75% of MTDs 
are granted either with or without leave to amend.119 These statistics indicate 
that movants in the FJC’s Iqbal sample ultimately prevail in a greater share of 
cases involving MTDs granted with leave to amend than did movants in the 
Conley sample. 
 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. Of these eighty cases, fifty-seven involved pending MTDs, and twenty-three involved 
cases in which the respondent still had the right to refile following an MTD granted with 
leave to amend and had not yet done so. Id. 
114.  Id. at 7 tbl.A-1. 
115.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4. 
116.  Id. 
117.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1. 
118.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4. 
119.  Id. 
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i i .  methodological underpinnings:  potential outcomes 
and judicial behavior effects  
This Note’s empirical objective is to analyze the effects of changes in 
pleading standards. Such analysis necessarily involves comparing observed case 
outcomes under the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal pleading regimes. These 
observed case outcomes are the result of deliberate decisions parties make. 
Some of these decisions will be different as a result of parties’ behavioral 
responses to the differing incentives under the two pleading regimes. To 
understand the interaction of party selection and judicial behavior effects, we 
must have language that allows us to separately characterize (i) the outcome 
that would happen in a case if the Conley standard governed and (ii) the 
outcome that would happen if, instead, the Twombly/Iqbal standard governed. 
Following what is sometimes known as the evaluation methodology literature, 
I will refer to these what-would-happen results as “potential outcomes.” 
If we could observe each case’s potential outcome under both pleading 
regimes, it would be a simple matter to measure the but-for effects of changing 
the pleading regime. We do observe cases’ outcomes under the pleading regime 
that actually governs at the time data are collected: a case’s actual outcome tells 
us the case’s potential outcome in the pleading regime currently in place. Thus, 
real-world data on MTDs adjudicated in the Conley era tell us about potential 
outcomes under Conley for cases that wind up facing MTDs when the Conley 
standard governs. Likewise, data on MTDs from the Twombly/Iqbal era tell us 
about potential outcomes under Twombly/Iqbal for cases that wind up facing 
MTDs when the Twombly/Iqbal standard governs. But we do not—and 
cannot—observe any case’s potential outcome in the pleading regime that is not 
actually in place at the time we collect data. Without making assumptions of 
one type or another, we cannot know what would have happened to cases that 
actually have MTDs filed under Conley had Twombly/Iqbal actually been in 
place, and so on. This quandary boils down to the observation that it is 
impossible to observe what would happen to the same unit of study in multiple 
mutually exclusive states of the world—a challenge known in the evaluation 
methodology literature as the fundamental evaluation problem.120 
 
120.  The literature concerning evaluation methodology is vast. Its object is to measure the causal 
“treatment” effects of changing a policy or other environmental behavior when only a single 
actual outcome can be observed. In the absence of random assignment experiments (and 
even sometimes in the presence of them), the fundamental evaluation problem cannot be 
solved without making some behavioral assumptions. For example, in this Note, I partially 
solve the fundamental evaluation problem by assuming that litigants are economically 
  
locking the doors to discovery?  
2297 
 
Suppose we assume that all cases in which MTDs are actually observed 
being filed under Conley would also have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal, 
and vice versa. Then the difference in observed grant rates across pleading 
regimes would identify the but-for impact of the pleading-standard switch on 
judicial behavior for these cases. But what if the parties change their litigation 
behavior when pleading standards change? Then as I discussed in the 
Introduction, simple comparisons of observed MTD grant rates under the two 
pleading regimes will mix together judicial behavior effects and changes in the 
composition of cases that face MTDs under the pleading regime that is actually 
in place. 
To avoid such compositional problems requires finding a way to hold fixed 
the set of cases whose outcomes we compare across pleading regimes. I will 
show how to do that in Part V. My more modest objective in the current Part is 
to develop two key building blocks that will help us get to Part V. In Section A 
of this Part, I develop a taxonomy for the various pre-discovery postures that 
cases can take as a function of parties’ choices.121 This taxonomy is critical to 
the rest of my methodological analysis in Parts III-V (and thus to my empirical 
work in Part VI). In Section B, I then give a precise definition to the concept of 
judicial behavior effects, which will also play an important role throughout 
Parts III-V in helping to distinguish the different channels through which 
heightened pleading creates negatively affected cases. 
Throughout this Part, and also throughout Parts III-V, I shall rely on a 
number of simplifying assumptions for the sake of exposition. I shall assume 
that each case involves a single plaintiff and a single defendant; that each case 
 
rational. That assumption turns out to provide enough behavioral structure to allow me to 
measure an object of interest, the lower bound on the negatively affected share among cases 
that face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal. To learn more than this lower bound, we would have 
to make stronger behavioral assumptions. For discussions of the fundamental evaluation 
problem in the applied econometrics literature, see, for example, James J. Heckman, Robert 
J. LaLonde & Jeffrey A. Smith, The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market 
Programs, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1865, 1879 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card 
eds., 1999). See also Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized 
and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 (1974), for an early and widely 
celebrated discussion of the potential-outcomes approach to defining causal effects; and 
Guido W. Imbens & Joshua D. Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average 
Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994), for a careful and widely cited discussion of 
treatment-effect heterogeneity in a potential-outcomes model. 
121.  Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of controversies than cases, since some of the 
“cases” I discuss will not be filed under one or both of the pleading regimes. For simplicity, 
though, I will use the word “cases” generically to refer to any controversy, whether litigated 
or not. 
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involves a single claim; that Rule 12(b)(6) is the only type of MTD that can be 
filed; and that when MTDs are granted, they are always granted without leave 
to amend.122 Each of these assumptions lacks realism in one way or another. 
But the main methodological points of my discussion would carry over to an 
appropriately generalized discussion, and making these assumptions greatly 
simplifies the expositional burden of dealing with multiple conceptually subtle 
issues. 
A. Developing a Taxonomy for Cases’ Pre-Discovery Posture 
In terms of the parties’ actions, a case might have any of four pre-discovery 
procedural postures. First, in “A” cases, the plaintiff files a complaint and the 
defendant then files an answer. Second, in “M” cases, the plaintiff files a 
complaint that the defendant attacks with a motion to dismiss, rather than 
answering. Third, in “D” cases, the plaintiff never files a complaint; instead, 
she “drops” the case without receiving any settlement. Fourth, in “S” cases, the 
parties agree to settle the case at some time before the defendant must file an 
answer or MTD. The S category includes both (i) settlements that occur before 
the plaintiff files her complaint and (ii) those that occur after the plaintiff files 
her complaint but before the defendant files either an answer or MTD. 
Given the pleading standard actually in place, a case’s potential party 
behavior is captured by the A, M, D, and S categories. But to understand the 
causal effects of changing pleading regimes requires a taxonomy of the pair of 
potential choices that parties would make when assigned to the different 
pleading regimes. For example, consider the set of cases that plaintiffs would 
file and defendants would answer under both pleading regimes. I will refer to 
these as “AA” cases, since they belong to category “A” under both the Conley 
and Twombly/Iqbal pleading regimes. Similarly, “MM” cases are those in 
which, under both pleading regimes, plaintiffs would file complaints that 
 
122.  In addition, I shall assume that filing MTDs and answers is mutually exclusive. This 
assumption rules out various procedural maneuvers, like a defendant’s choosing to file a 
post-answer Rule 12(c) motion, or to file both (i) an answer to two alleged claims and (ii) a 
Rule 12(b)(6) MTD on the first claim only. A defendant might choose to do this out of fear 
that, if the judge denies the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the judge might then also 
discount Rule 15(a)(2)’s admonition that the court should “freely give leave” to amend an 
answer “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). In any case, assuming that 
defendants do not file MTDs and answers simultaneously is just a way to be able to use the 
simple phrase “file an answer” rather than more cumbersome ones that cover all possible 
eventualities, like “choose not to act in such a way as to forfeit one’s ability to prevent 
discovery on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim.” 
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defendants would attack via MTDs. Cases that would be answered under 
Conley but would face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal are “AM” cases, and so on. 
Because there are four potential outcomes—A, M, D, and S—under each 
pleading standard, there are sixteen total categories. Figure 1 shows these 
categories in a four-by-four matrix, with the rows given by Conley potential 
outcomes and the columns given by Twombly/Iqbal potential outcomes. 
 
Figure 1. 
a taxonomy of cases in terms of their potential outcomes under the 
conley and twombly/iqbal pleading regimes 
 
  outcome under twombly/iqbal standard 




















MD MS MA MM 
 
If party behavior were unaffected by switching pleading standards, then 
every controversy would fit into one of the cells labeled DD, SS, AA, or MM. 
To understand selection is thus to understand why some cases might instead 
appear in any of Figure 1’s twelve other cells. Before I address that issue in Part 
III, though, it will be useful to show how potential outcomes can be used to 
precisely define the judicial behavior effects associated with a change in 
pleading standards. 
B. Judicial Behavior Effects 
When I use the term “judicial behavior effects,” I have in mind the familiar 
sense of but-for causation: cases that exhibit judicial behavior effects are those 
in which a motion to dismiss would be granted under one pleading regime, but 
not the other, in the (counterfactual) event that the case faced MTDs under 
both pleading regimes. Notice that the concept of judicial behavior effects is 
thus defined even for cases that would never have MTDs filed. For example, 
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there may be judicial behavior effects in AA cases, even though defendants 
would never file MTDs in these cases under either pleading regime.123 
Consider the set of MM cases, which would have MTDs filed under both 
pleading regimes. Figure 2 shows that this group of cases can be divided into 
four subcategories. Let “MD” indicate the compound potential outcome that a 
case would have a motion to dismiss filed and that the MTD would be denied. 
Analogously, let “MG” indicate the compound potential outcome that a case 
would have a motion to dismiss filed and that the MTD would be granted. 
Then MM cases in which the MTD would be denied under Conley and also 
under Twombly/Iqbal—that is, MDMD cases—belong to the figure’s top-left cell. 
Similarly, MM cases in which the MTD would be granted under both pleading 
standards belong to the figure’s bottom-right, MGMG cell. By definition, judges 
in MDMD and MGMG cases would do the same thing under Conley as they 
would do under Twombly/Iqbal. 
As far as I know, no one believes that there are any cases in which Twombly 
or Iqbal would lead to a more lenient pleading standard. Therefore, 
Twombly/Iqbal’s judicial behavior effects operate in one direction only, via cases 
in which a judge would (i) deny a motion to dismiss under Conley, if one were 
filed, but (ii) grant a motion to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal, if one were filed. 
Therefore, the figure’s bottom-left cell is grayed out, indicating that there will 
be no MGMD cases. 
 
Figure 2.  
illustrating the judicial behavior effect for mm cases  
 
  motion outcome under twombly/iqbal 
  denied granted 
denied MDMD MDMG 
motion outcome 
under conley 
granted MGMD MGMG 
 
123.  To illustrate, suppose that under Conley, MTDs would be granted in half of AA cases if 
defendants filed MTDs in all these cases, and suppose that under Twombly/Iqbal, MTDs 
would be granted in 60% of them if defendants filed MTDs. Then the judicial behavior 
effect for AA cases would be ten percentage points (60% minus 50%), even though no AA 
case would ever face a motion to dismiss under either pleading regime. Judicial behavior 
effects are thus counterfactual objects—they depend on events that logically could happen, 
regardless of whether those events ever do happen. 
  




 We come now to the top-right cell of Figure 2, where the judicial-behavior 
action is. For this cell’s cases, which I label MDMG, a motion to dismiss would 
be denied under Conley but granted under Twombly/Iqbal. In other words, but 
for the switch to Twombly/Iqbal, MTDs would be denied for these cases. Thus, 
these are the cases that involve changes in judicial behavior. Since the number 
of such cases will rise and fall with the total number of MM cases, it will often 
be useful to think of the judicial behavior effect in relative terms, as the number 
of MDMG cases divided by the total number of MM cases. 
To make all of this concrete, in Figure 3 I provide two illustrative numerical 
examples. In each example, there are a total of forty MM cases, and twenty of 
these are MGMG cases—cases in which MTDs would be granted under either 
pleading regime. In Panel (a), there are an additional twelve cases in the MDMD 
cell, and eight in the MDMG cell. Eight divided by forty is 0.20, so switching 
from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal would cause 20% of the forty MM cases in this 
example to have MTDs granted rather than denied. In Panel (b), all MM cases 
in which the MTD is denied under Conley also have it denied under 
Twombly/Iqbal: there are no MDMG cases, and thus there is no judicial behavior 
effect among MM cases in this Panel. 
Notice that in both examples in Figure 3, the difference in grant rates across 
pleading regimes equals the judicial behavior effect. In Panel (a), the MTD 
grant rate is 70% under Twombly/Iqbal and 50% under Conley, so the cross-
pleading regime grant-rate difference is twenty percentage points—the same as 
the judicial behavior effect. In Panel (b), the MTD grant rates are the same, 
since no cases appear in the MDMG cell, so the difference in grant rates across 
pleading regimes is zero—again the same as the judicial behavior effect. 
Thus, if we could isolate MM cases and measure the difference in grant 
rates across pleading regimes for them only, we would be able to calculate their 
judicial behavior effect. Unfortunately, I show in Part IV that once we allow for 
the possibility that there is party selection, there is no way to learn the judicial 
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Figure 3.  
two examples illustrating the judicial behavior effect for mm cases  
 
panel (a): an example with a judicial behavior effect of twenty percent 
  motion outcome under twombly/iqbal  






12 8 20 
motion 
outcome  
under conley   
granted 
 




12 28 40 
 
panel (b): an example with a zero judicial behavior effect 
  motion outcome under twombly/iqbal  






10 0 10 
motion 
outcome  
under conley   
granted 
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i i i .  party selection in an economic model of litigation  
In Section III.A, I introduce a typical economic model of litigation, in 
which procedure plays no role. A single plaintiff and a single defendant decide 
whether to litigate or settle a single claim, and litigation involves no procedural 
aspects.124 As such, this model is of no direct use to understanding the selection 
effects of changes in procedural rules like those involved in Twombly/Iqbal. But 
this model is worth a quick exposition, because it helps introduce some central 
concepts in a simple context, which might be useful for readers who are 
 
124.  See, for example, Priest & Klein, supra note 15, for such a model. 
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unfamiliar with economic models of litigation.125 In Section III.B, I incorporate 
pre-discovery procedural issues and discuss the ways in which a change in 
pleading regimes induces party selection behavior. In Section III.C, I discuss 
the ways in which a change in pleading regimes induces party selection. 
A. A Simple Economic Model of Litigation  
Parties will settle whenever there is a positive surplus from doing so. 
Surplus is defined as the difference between the defendant’s net expected costs 
from litigating and the plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigation. Each 
party’s net expected gain (or cost) equals its gross gain minus (plus) its 
litigation costs.  
The plaintiff’s gross expected gain from litigation equals the probability she 
assigns to the event that she will win if the parties litigate, times the gain she 
expects if she wins.126 Suppose the plaintiff believes that (i) she has a 75% 
chance of winning in litigation and that (ii) if she does win, she will win $1 
million. Then her gross expected gain is 75% of $1 million, or $750,000. 
Litigation is costly, though, so the plaintiff’s net expected gain is less than this 
amount. Suppose the plaintiff’s expected litigation costs equal $100,000. Then 
her net expected gain from litigation equals her gross expected gain of 
$750,000 minus her expected litigation costs of $100,000, or $650,000.127 
The defendant’s net expected costs from litigating equal the sum of her 
gross expected loss given that the parties litigate and her expected litigation 
costs. The defendant’s gross expected loss, in turn, equals her perceived 
probability of losing if the parties litigate times the loss she expects when she 
 
125.  Readers familiar with ideas like settlement surplus can skip ahead to Section III.B. 
126.  Note that “gains” here need not be confined to pecuniary returns; nothing in my analysis 
prevents plaintiffs (or defendants, for that matter) from assigning value to cases based on 
considerations of principle, revenge, or any other moral or emotional motive. All that 
matters is that such value can be quantified by the plaintiff herself. 
127.  Notice that the variables that determine the plaintiff’s net expected costs are inherently 
subjective variables; what drives party behavior according to the economic model is the 
parties’ own assessments. This is true even if parties make “mistakes” in assessing the 
strength or value of their cases, in the sense of being overconfident, or unnecessarily 
pessimistic, relative to actual results in similar cases. Indeed, in the absence of such 
“mistakes,” the economic model predicts there would be no litigation at all—since the 
parties would agree on the values of all variables, they would settle all cases to avoid 
litigation costs. For classic accounts of differences in party estimates concerning litigation 
variables, see, for example, Posner, supra note 25, at 418-20; and Priest & Klein, supra note 
15, at 9-24. 
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litigates and loses. Suppose the defendant believes she has a 50% chance of 
losing if the parties litigate, and suppose that she expects she will have to pay 
damages of $500,000 when she loses. Then her gross expected loss is 50% of 
$500,000, or $250,000. Suppose the defendant expects her litigation costs to 
be $150,000. Then her net expected costs from litigating equal $250,000 plus 
$150,000, or $400,000. In this example, the defendant’s net expected costs 
from litigating are lower than the plaintiff’s expected gains from litigating. 
There is no settlement amount such that each party will believe herself better 
off than she will be if they litigate. Consequently, the economic model of 
litigation predicts that the parties will litigate. 
But now consider an altered version of this example, one in which the 
defendant agrees with the plaintiff both that the plaintiff’s probability of 
prevailing in litigation is 75% and that the plaintiff would win damages of $1 
million if the plaintiff did win. Then, like the plaintiff’s gross expected gain 
from litigation, the defendant’s gross expected costs from litigation would 
equal $750,000. Adding the defendant’s expected litigation costs of $150,000 
to this figure, we see that the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating 
now would be $900,000, while the plaintiff’s net expected gain from litigating 
would continue to be $650,000. The defendant thinks she has $250,000 more 
to lose from litigation than the plaintiff thinks she stands to gain, so there is 
now positive settlement surplus. In this simple example, the parties would 
understand that litigating is equivalent to setting fire to a quarter of a million 
dollars.128 As a result, the economic model of litigation predicts that the parties 
would settle in this example.129 
 
128.  This view of settlement is not universal; for an impassioned critique of settlement, see 
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). According to Fiss: 
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without 
authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial 
involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be 
done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass 
society and should be neither encouraged nor praised. 
Id. at 1075.  
129.  Predicting the amount of the actual settlement requires a model of bargaining. The standard 
model used in the economics of litigation has three main inputs: the plaintiff’s reservation 
position, the defendant’s reservation position, and some measure of bargaining power. The 
plaintiff’s reservation position is what she gets in the absence of a settlement—namely, her 
net expected gains from litigating. The defendant’s reservation position is what she pays in 
the absence of a settlement—her net expected costs from litigating. The economic model of 
litigation predicts (i) that the plaintiff will never accept a settlement amount below her 
reservation position, which is $650,000 in our current example and (ii) that the defendant 
  
locking the doors to discovery?  
2305 
 
As skeletal as this model is, it has enough flesh to cover the fact that party-
chosen case selection complicates the measurement of legal change. Changes in 
legal rules, whether substantive or procedural, generally change at least one of 
the main model inputs—parties’ perceived win probabilities, their expectations 
concerning the value of gains or losses when the plaintiff wins, or their 
expectations concerning the costs of litigation. The contrast between the two 
examples above demonstrates that changes in these model inputs can affect 
whether a case settles before formal adjudication. Consequently, changes in 
legal rules change model inputs, affecting party behavior, so that the sets of 
cases that are litigated differ across different regimes of legal rules. Simple 
comparisons of adjudicative results, like how often plaintiffs win at trial,130 
tend to mix together (i) the effects of changes in legal rules on cases that would 
be litigated regardless of the choice of legal rules and (ii) changes in case 
composition that result from the change in legal rules. Party selection thus 
lurks beneath the empirical surface, laying a trap for researchers who try to 
measure the effects of changes in legal rules using before-and-after 
comparisons of variables that seem to measure outcomes of interest. 
B. Extending the Model To Account for Pre-Trial Process 
In this Section, I develop the simplest model that can account for changes 
in pleading standards; note that I continue to maintain the assumptions stated 
in the introductory text of this Part. Once a plaintiff has filed her case,131 the 
defendant has three options before trial: settle the case for an amount the 
plaintiff will accept, file a motion to dismiss, or file an answer and proceed to 
 
will never agree to pay a settlement amount above her reservation position, which is 
$900,000. Bargaining power determines where in the interval between $650,000 and 
$900,000 the parties will settle. For example, if the parties have equal bargaining power, 
they will split the difference—which is the $250,000 surplus—and settle for $775,000. 
According to the economic model, if the plaintiff had more bargaining power, then she 
would receive a settlement of more than $775,000 (though no more than $900,000), and if 
the plaintiff had less bargaining power, she would receive a lesser settlement (though no less 
than $650,000). 
130.  See Priest & Klein, supra note 15, for a classic discussion of win rates; for other examples, see 
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination Disputes 
for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects To Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 
427, 427-462 (1995); and Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: 
New Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1999). 
131.  Below I modify the discussion to allow plaintiffs to decide whether or not to file suit in the 
first place. 
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discovery. A motion to dismiss may result in either of two possible outcomes: a 
denial or a grant. If the MTD is denied, the defendant’s expected future costs 
associated with the post-answer/MTD stage of the case will be the same after 
the motion’s adjudication as they were before the defendant filed the motion.132 
That is, the MTD’s adjudication affects only whether such costs will come into 
play, not their expected magnitude. A granted MTD eliminates the targeted 
claim, so the defendant’s subsequent costs associated with the claim would be 
zero. I will assume for purposes of this discussion that when MTDs are 
granted, they are granted without leave for the plaintiff to amend her 
complaint.133 A rational defendant will file a motion to dismiss whenever the 
cost of litigating the motion is less than the product of (i) the probability  
the defendant assigns to the event that the motion would be granted and  
(ii) the expected costs that the defendant avoids as a result of the dismissal. All 
else equal, then, the greater the defendant’s perceived probability of winning a 
motion to dismiss, the more likely she will be to file one. 
Rational plaintiffs will not always file suit. According to the economic 
model of litigation, they will do so if and only if their net expected gains from 
litigating are positive. These net expected gains will depend partly on whether 
the plaintiff expects the defendant to exercise her option to file a motion to 
dismiss. If the plaintiff thinks the defendant will file a motion to dismiss, then 
the plaintiff will recognize both (i) that she will have to bear the costs of 
litigating this motion to protect her claim and (ii) that there is some chance 
that a motion to dismiss will be granted, which would eliminate the net 
expected gains from litigating discussed in Section III.A. Thus, a rational 
plaintiff who expects an MTD to be filed must balance (a) the total costs of 
filing suit and litigating the MTD against the product of (b) the probability the 
plaintiff assigns to the event that the MTD would be denied and (c) the 
plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating when the MTD is denied. All else 
equal, plaintiffs will be more likely to file suit when they perceive a lower 
probability that a defendant’s MTD would be denied. Conversely, an increase 
 
132.  If the motion is denied, then the defendant’s net expected costs associated with the case will 
depend on whether the defendant subsequently would settle the case or would litigate. It is 
algebraically complicated to sort out the details of this decision, so I do not do so here. See 
Gelbach, supra note 66, for a discussion of this issue. 
133.  It is straightforward, but again, somewhat complicated algebraically, to extend the model to 
account for grants with leave to amend. The complication is that the effect of a grant with 
leave to amend on the defendant’s costs depends on post-grant decisions by both parties—
whether the plaintiff would file an amended complaint, whether the defendant would file a 
motion to dismiss that complaint, whether the parties might settle, and so on. I do allow for 
this possibility in Gelbach, supra note 66; the main qualitative results are unaffected. 
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in the MTD grant probability will reduce the number of cases plaintiffs are 
willing to file. 
C. Party Selection Effects in the Economic Model of Litigation  
We can now explore the broad contours of how a change in the pleading 
regime causes party selection. Suppose that a change in procedural rules 
increases each party’s perceived probability that a motion to dismiss would be 
granted—as many observers, and virtually all critics, think Twombly and Iqbal 
do. Defendants will believe their returns to filing MTDs have risen. As a result, 
under Twombly/Iqbal they will file MTDs against some complaints that they 
would answer under Conley—there will be some defendant selection. In terms 
of the case taxonomy I introduced in connection with Figure 1, the existence of 
defendant selection means that there will be some cases in Figure 1’s AM cell. 
To emphasize the presence of defendant selection, I redraw Figure 1’s four-by-
four matrix in Figure 4, lightly shading the AM cell. 
 
Figure 4.  
taxonomy of case types in terms of party behavior, emphasizing 
defendant and plaintiff selection  
 
  outcome under twombly/iqbal standard 
























1. Box with lighter shading involves defendant selection  
2. Boxes with darker shading involve plaintiff selection  
 
I have also shaded Figure 4’s AD and MD cells, emphasizing that these cells 
are ones in which the plaintiff (i) would file a complaint under Conley but  
(ii) would drop the case under Twombly/Iqbal. Such plaintiff selection occurs in 
cases where a switch to heightened pleading increases a plaintiff’s perceived 
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probability that a motion to dismiss would be granted against her complaint. 
The plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating will fall if she thinks the 
defendant might file an MTD. Some plaintiffs will choose not to file their cases 
in the first place as a result of this reduction in net expected gains from litigating. 
Recall that the economic model of litigation predicts the parties will settle 
whenever there is a positive settlement surplus—whenever the defendant’s net 
expected costs from litigating minus the plaintiff’s net expected gains is 
positive. Increasing each party’s perceived probability that a defendant’s MTD 
would be granted if filed reduces both the plaintiff’s net expected gains from 
filing suit and the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating. Since both of 
these “nets” fall, a switch to heightened pleading might either increase or 
reduce settlement surplus in any given case. Heightened pleading therefore 
might induce the parties to settle some cases they would have litigated under 
Conley,134 but it also might cause settlements to break down in other cases. This 
is why switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal could cause some settlement 
selection, the catch-all term I use to refer to cases that would be settled under 
one, but not both, of the pleading regimes. In terms of the taxonomy of cases I 
introduced in connection with Figure 1, settlement selection cases appear in the 
AS, MS, DS, SA, SM, and SD cells. In Figure 5, I highlight these cells with dark 
shading to indicate that the cases they represent involve settlement selection. 
 
Figure 5.  
taxonomy of case types in terms of party behavior, emphasizing 
defendant, plaintiff, and settlement selection 
 
  outcome under twombly/iqbal standard 
  dropped settled answered mtd filed 
dropped DD DS DA DM 
settled SD SS SA SM 









1. Box with lightest shading (AM) involves defendant selection 
2. Boxes with intermediate shading (AD, MD) involve plaintiff selection  
3. Boxes with darkest shading (other boxes) involve settlement selection 
 
134.  This is true regardless of whether the defendant would have answered or challenged the 
complaint with a motion to dismiss. 
  
locking the doors to discovery?  
2309 
 
Economic models are useful in part because they help clarify the channels 
through which behavior occurs. They are also useful in another way: they can 
help us understand which sorts of behavior will not occur at all if agents are 
rational. The economic model of litigation has this second property. It predicts 
there will be no cases of certain types, which allows us to disregard them 
moving forward. Consider the MA controversy type, in which (i) the plaintiff 
would file a complaint under both pleading standards; (ii) the defendant 
would challenge this complaint with a motion to dismiss under Conley; but  
(iii) the defendant would answer the complaint under Twombly/Iqbal. The 
economic model predicts that for no case would a rational defendant ever 
follow this pattern of behavior. Holding constant the details of the case, 
switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal will never increase a defendant’s net 
expected costs from litigating, as of the time when the defendant must make 
her MTD/answer decision.135 Thus, if it would make sense for the defendant to 
prefer filing an MTD over filing an answer under Conley, it must also make 
sense for her to prefer filing the MTD under Twombly/Iqbal. If defendants are 
rational, then, the economic model predicts there will be no MA cases. A 
similar, if somewhat lengthy, argument can be deployed to establish that there 
will be no SA cases, either.136 Finally, it is possible to show that rational 
plaintiffs will always drop cases under Twombly/Iqbal that they would drop 
under Conley.137 All together, these results tell us there will be no cases of types 
 
135.  This is true because the only effect of switching to heightened pleading is to increase the 
probability that a motion to dismiss is granted in a case. So if the defendant answers, her 
costs moving forward in the case will be unaffected by the change in pleading standards. 
136.  This argument is as follows. Since the defendant would agree to settle under Conley, the 
settlement payment under Conley must be less than her net expected costs from litigating 
would be if she filed an answer. The argument in note 135 establishes that the defendant’s 
net expected costs from litigating, once the MTD stage has passed, would be the same under 
Conley and Twombly/Iqbal. Therefore, the Conley settlement payment must be less than the 
net expected costs from litigating under Twombly/Iqbal. Now, the settlement payment the 
defendant must make to the plaintiff will not rise as a result of switching from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal, because the defendant’s reservation position never worsens, and the 
plaintiff’s reservation position never improves, as a result of this switch. Therefore, the 
Twombly/Iqbal settlement payment cannot be greater than the Conley settlement payment, 
which establishes that it must be less than the net expected costs from litigating under 
Twombly/Iqbal. 
137.  The plaintiff drops the suit under Conley, so her net gain must be negative under Conley. 
Since her net expected gain from litigating cannot rise as a result of the switch from Conley 
to Twombly/Iqbal, the plaintiff’s net gain must also be negative under Twombly/Iqbal. Thus, 
a rational plaintiff would drop any case under Twombly/Iqbal that she would drop under 
Conley. 
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MA, SA, DA, DM, or DS. I depict this fact by blacking out the cells corresponding 
to these controversy types in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  
taxonomy of cases, emphasizing “empty” controversy types and all 
forms of selection 
 
  outcome under twombly/iqbal standard 
  dropped settled answered mtd filed 
dropped DD    
settled SD SS  SM 









1. Box with lightest shading involves defendant selection  
2. Boxes with intermediate shading involve plaintiff selection  
3. Boxes with darkest shading involve settlement selection  
4. Blacked-out boxes denote case types that will not occur 
 
Figure 6 captures all the qualitative predictions concerning party behavior 
that can be made, without further assumptions, using the extended economic 
model of litigation I have developed in this Section.138 Its implications include 
the following: 
 
 If the parties are economically rational, there will be no cases of the 
MA, SA, DA, DM, or DS types. 
 Of the eleven remaining types of cases that are consistent with 
economic rationality, only the AA, MM, SS, and DD types involve 
no party selection. 
 
138.  With further assumptions, one can make further predictions. For example, it is possible to 
rule out the presence of any SD or SM cases by assuming that the switch from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal causes the plaintiff’s net expected gains from litigating to fall at least as much 
as the defendant’s net expected costs from litigating fall. Under such an assumption, 
settlement surplus cannot fall, so parties would always settle under Twombly/Iqbal if they 
would settle under Conley. This assumption might hold in some cases, and it might even be 
reasonable in most. But it is a real restriction on the way the parties’ beliefs change as a 
result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. 
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 In four economically rational types of cases—AM, MD, MS, and 
SM—MTDs are filed under one pleading standard but not the 
other. 
 There may be other forms of party selection, too—AD, AS, and 
SD—which involve both plaintiff selection (AD) and settlement 
selection (AS and SD). 
 Various gross effects of selection will cause the number of: 
-  cases filed to rise (SM cases);139 
- cases filed to fall (AD and MD cases); 
- MTDs filed to rise (AM and SM cases); 
-  MTDs filed to fall (MS and MD cases). 
 
In addition, as I discuss in the next Part, there will be distinct selection 
effects that cause the number of MTDs granted to rise and also to fall. Thus, 
economic rationality of party behavior is consistent with observing any pattern 
of net changes in the numbers of cases filed, the number of MTDs filed, and 
the number of MTDs granted. This observation is the central problem that 
makes comparing grant rates across pleading regimes problematic, a point to 
which I turn in Part IV. 
iv.  what comparing grant rates across pleading regimes 
misses  
If we could separate MM cases from other cases in which we observe MTDs 
filed, it would be simple to determine their judicial behavior effect. As Section 
II.B showed, we could do so by subtracting the MTD grant rate among those 
MM cases that are actually adjudicated under the Conley pleading standard 
from the MTD grant rate for those MM cases that are actually adjudicated 
under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. That is, if it were possible to 
isolate only MM cases for consideration, the difference in MTD grant rates 
across pleading regimes would tell us the judicial behavior effect for these 
cases. But given the fundamental evaluation problem discussed in Part II—that 
we cannot observe both potential outcomes for any case—it will be impossible 
to distinguish MM cases from others that actually have MTDs filed under 
whatever regime is in place. For example, among cases facing MTDs under 
 
139.  The SM case category includes cases that would settle under Conley but be filed and face 
MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal. Because some such cases would be settled before the plaintiff 
files a complaint, switching pleading standards causes them to be filed and thus increases 
the number of cases filed.  
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Conley, some may be MM cases and others MD; among cases facing MTDs 
under Twombly/Iqbal, some may be MM cases and others AM. 
One “solution” to this problem is to ignore selection, assuming away the 
possibility of having any MS, MD, AM, or SM cases to distinguish. If this 
assumption were correct, then all cases with MTDs actually filed in either 
pleading regime would be MM cases. Consequently, differences in grant rates 
across pleading regimes would reveal the judicial behavior effect for MM cases. 
But the discussion in Section III.C quite strongly suggests that there will be 
party selection in response to perceived changes in pleading standards. Indeed, 
empirical evidence showing a substantively large increase in the proportion of 
cases that have MTDs filed indicates that there likely is considerable defendant 
selection, at the very least.140 
Unfortunately, as I show in this Part, the simple possibility that party 
selection exists renders comparisons of MTD grant rates across pleading 
regimes an unreliable measure of judicial behavior effects. A simple way to 
demonstrate this fact is to show that for a given judicial behavior effect size 
among MM cases, the MTD grant rate can rise, fall, or remain unchanged 
following a switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Table 1 provides three simple 
numerical examples that prove this claim. In all three examples, I reuse the 
numbers from the example in Panel (a) of Figure 3: there are twenty MGMG 
cases, twelve MDMD cases, and eight MDMG cases. In each example, then, the 
judicial behavior effect of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal is to cause an 
additional 20% of MM cases to have MTDs granted. 
In Example 1, there are no other relevant types of cases. Thus, as the 
bottom part of Table 1 shows, there are twenty MTDs filed under Conley and 
twenty-eight granted under Twombly/Iqbal. The observed MTD grant rates, in 
percentage terms, are 50% under Conley and 70% under Twombly/Iqbal. In 
Example 1, then, all is well: the cross-pleading-regime difference in MTD grant 
rates is twenty percentage points (70% minus 50%), exactly equal to the 
judicial behavior effect among MM cases. 
 
140.  See supra text accompanying note 94.  
  
locking the doors to discovery?  
2313 
 
Table 1.  
three numerical examples illustrating the sensitivity of cross-pleading 
regime differences in mtd grant rates to party selection  
 
 
 example 1: grant rate rises 
example 2: 
same grant rate 
example 3: 
grant rate falls 
mgmg 20 20 20 
mdmd 12 12 12 
mdmg 8 8 8 



















20% 20% 20% 

















amd 0 23 27 
















mdd 0 5 5 
mgs 0 0 0 
mds 0 0 0 



































granted 20 28 25 35 25 31 










grant rate 50% 70% 50% 50% 50% 44% 
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In Example 2, I assume there is some defendant selection. There are a total 
of thirty AM cases—those that (i) would have answers filed under Conley but 
(ii) would have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. Of these, seven are AMG 
cases, which means that MTDs would be filed and granted in these cases under 
Twombly/Iqbal, and the remaining twenty-three are AMD cases, which means 
that in these cases MTDs would be filed and denied under Twombly/Iqbal. In 
addition, Example 2 involves some plaintiff selection. There are five MGD 
cases, those in which (i) under Conley, the plaintiff would file suit and 
defendants would file MTDs that judges would grant, and that (ii) under 
Twombly/Iqbal, plaintiffs would drop. There are another five MDD cases, whose 
MTDs in condition (i) would be denied under Conley, rather than granted. For 
simplicity, I assume there is no settlement selection, which is why I have 
assumed that there are no MGS, MDS, SMG, or SMD cases. 
How many MTDs are actually granted under Conley in Example 2? There are 
the twenty grants in MGMG cases, and there are an additional five grants in MGD 
cases, so there are twenty-five total grants under Conley. What about MTD 
filings? There are forty MM cases with MTD filings under Conley (twenty MGMG 
plus twelve MDMD plus eight MDMG), and there are another ten MD cases with 
filings under Conley (five each in MGD and MDD cases). Thus, we will observe a 
total of fifty MTD filings under Conley. The MTD grant rate among these cases 
is therefore 50% (twenty-five out of fifty). What about actually observed filings 
and grants under Twombly/Iqbal? There are twenty MGMG cases and eight MDMG 
cases, and there are another seven AMG cases, so thirty-five MTDs would 
actually be granted under Twombly/Iqbal. There would be seventy MTDs actually 
filed under Twombly/Iqbal—forty MM cases, plus seven AMG cases plus twenty-
three AMD cases. With thirty-five actual grants out of seventy actual filings, the 
MTD grant rate actually observed under Twombly/Iqbal in Example 2 would be 
50%—the same as would actually be observed under Conley. Example 2 has a 
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes equal to zero, even though both 
examples have the same judicial behavior effect among MM cases. 
Now consider Example 3. The only difference between it and Example 2 is 
that I have switched four cases from the AMG row to the AMD row: there are 
now three AMG cases rather than seven, and twenty-seven AMD cases rather 
than twenty-three. As a result of this tinkering, we now have only thirty-one 
MTDs granted when Twombly/Iqbal governs, out of seventy actual filings. The 
MTD grant rate actually observed under Twombly/Iqbal thus falls to 44%—six 
percentage points below the grant rate of 50% observed under Conley. And yet 
the judicial behavior effect among MM cases remains 20%. 
Why does the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes fail to track 
the judicial behavior effect among MM cases in Examples 2 and 3? Because the 
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composition of cases that actually have MTDs filed differs across the two 
pleading regimes. Look again at Example 2, where defendant selection causes 
thirty AM cases to enter the set of cases with MTDs filed. Of these thirty cases, 
only seven—or 23%—actually have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal. This 
is far below the 70% grant rate among MM cases. It is this discrepancy in 
Twombly/Iqbal MTD grant rates among defendant-selection and MM cases that 
drives down the MTD grant rate. That is how compositional changes due to 
party selection confound our ability to measure judicial behavior effects using 
the difference in actual MTD grant rates across pleading regimes.141 
These three simple numerical examples support an important and powerful 
general conclusion. Without more information about party behavior, neither 
the direction nor the magnitude of the difference in MTD grant rates across 
pleading regimes tells us anything about the magnitude of any judicial 
behavior effects. On its face, then, the existing empirical literature on 
Twombly/Iqbal cannot tell us much about judicial behavior effects.142 
As dark a cloud as this analysis casts, it does have an ironic silver lining: 
given that there is party selection, judicial behavior effects would be an 
inadequate measure of the impact of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal in 
any case. Consider a case in which the defendant expects she will bear $250,000 
dollars in net costs if she answers a complaint. If the defendant’s perceived 
probability of winning at the MTD stage is 10% under Conley, she reduces her 
expected net costs by $25,000 (10% of $250,000) if she files the MTD. If it costs 
$26,000 to litigate a motion to dismiss, the defendant will file an answer rather 
than a motion to dismiss under Conley. But if the defendant’s perceived 
probability of winning at the MTD stage is 14% under Twombly/Iqbal, filing the 
 
141.  Consider a further tweak to Example 2, in which twenty-one of the thirty AM cases in 
Example 2 would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, rather than seven. In that 
event, there would be forty-nine MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal (twenty-eight 
MM plus twenty-one AM), implying an actual MTD grant rate of 70%. This modification 
illustrates something that can be proved using tedious algebra: the presence of selection will 
not prevent us from measuring judicial behavior effects when, and only when, the selected 
cases would have the same MTD grant rates as MM cases under the pleading regime in 
which the selected cases actually have MTDs filed. There is no reason to believe this 
condition will hold in practice. Indeed, the economic model of litigation suggests good 
reasons to believe that cases that do not always have MTDs filed will have different MTD 
grant rates than cases that do when we hold constant the pleading regime actually in place. 
142.  Of course, authors working in this literature might have other objectives than measuring 
judicial behavior effects as I have defined them. But I am unaware of any who have clearly 
stated an alternative object of study, and my reading of the literature is that judicial behavior 
effects are the object of estimation. 
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MTD reduces her expected net costs by $35,000. Therefore, she will file an MTD 
under Twombly/Iqbal, so hers is an AM case. Suppose the defendant is correct 
that her case has a 14% probability of dismissal under Twombly/Iqbal. And now 
imagine that there are 999 other cases just like our defendant’s, whose 
defendants have the same beliefs she does. Roughly 140 of these cases (14% of 
1000) will have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, compared to zero of them 
that would have MTDs granted under Conley. 
Even if we could measure the judicial behavior effect among MM cases, 
then, stopping there would disregard the dismissal under Twombly/Iqbal of 
roughly 140 AM cases, all of which would have been answered under Conley. 
This example illustrates that there are other channels besides judicial behavior 
effects through which a switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal affects the parties. 
The same overall point applies to cases in which plaintiff selection and 
settlement selection operate. Any measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s effects should 
take account of effects operating through such channels. 
v. what can be measured: bounds on the negatively 
affected share of twombly/ iqbal mtd cases 
In this Part, I focus on the set of cases that would face MTDs under 
Twombly/Iqbal. For short, I will refer to these cases as “Twombly/Iqbal MTD 
cases.” This set of cases does not vary with the actual pleading regime in place, 
a feature I have argued is critical to avoiding selection-induced compositional 
problems. Moreover, unlike the set of MM cases, the set of Twombly/Iqbal 
MTD cases is observable: cases that would face MTDs under Twombly/Iqbal 
actually do face MTDs when the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard is in place. 
In Section A of this Part, I define a new measure of Twombly/Iqbal’s effects, 
the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. The negatively 
affected share accounts not only for judicial behavior effects among MM cases, 
but also for cases affected through the party-selection channels I discussed at 
the end of Part IV. Like the judicial behavior effect, the negatively affected 
share has the rather unfortunate problem of being impossible to observe when 
party selection occurs. But unlike judicial behavior effects, the negatively 
affected share can be meaningfully bounded using observable data, even when 
there is party selection of unknown types and magnitudes. 
In Section B, I provide some numerical examples that illustrate how the 
negatively affected share, and my lower bound on it, are related to various types 
of party selection. In Section C, I discuss the relationship between the negatively 
affected share and the discovery-prevented share. The discovery-prevented share, 
which measures the share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases that miss discovery as a 
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result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal, is of interest given the central 
role that discovery-related issues have played in the debate over Twombly/Iqbal. 
In Section D, I relate the lower bound on the negatively affected share to 
the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes used in previous work. I 
then show that the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes will always 
lie below my lower bound when the number of MTDs actually filed rises after 
the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. One can thus view the difference 
between my lower bound and the cross-pleading-regime grant-rate difference 
as a partial correction for net party selection into MTD filing.143 
A. The Negatively Affected Share Among Twombly/Iqbal MTD Cases  
We saw at the end of Part IV that switching to heightened pleading affects 
case outcomes not only through changes in judicial behavior, but also through 
party selection. Consider again Example 2 from Table 1. In that example, 
switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal induces eight MDMG cases to have 
MTDs granted as a result of changes in judicial behavior, while seven AMG cases 
have MTDs granted as a result of defendant selection. A good measure of the 
effects of Twombly/Iqbal should account not only for the first set of affected cases, 
but also for the second. After all, both sets of cases wind up with MTDs granted 
as a result of the change in pleading standards. Thus, both types of cases miss 
discovery as a result of the switch in pleading standards. 
These discovery-prevented cases are not the only cases that have MTDs 
granted as a result of switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. The switch to 
heightened pleading also makes plaintiffs worse off in SMG cases, even though 
plaintiffs are not prevented from reaching discovery in these cases. Under 
Conley, plaintiffs receive settlements in these cases, and the plaintiffs do not 
have to litigate a motion to dismiss. But under Twombly/Iqbal, these plaintiffs 
must pay to litigate MTDs, which result in the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
claims. Thus, MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases all involve harm to plaintiffs caused 
by switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Together, MDMG, AMG, and SMG 
cases constitute the set of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases in which plaintiffs are 
negatively affected by the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal.144   
 
143.  When we come to Part VI, we will see that even this partial correction is empirically 
substantial. This correction is only partial because, when there is either plaintiff or 
settlement selection, my lower bound is less than the negatively affected share itself. 
144.  All three of these types of cases are Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. In addition, there are no 
other types of cases in this set that would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal but not 
under Conley (recall that there will be no DMG cases if plaintiffs are rational, see supra 
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A natural way to measure the negative effects of Twombly/Iqbal on plaintiffs 
would be to compute the ratio of (i) the number of MDMG, AMG, and SMG 
cases to (ii) the total number of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. This ratio is the 
negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases.145 As I noted above, an 
important feature of the set of Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases is that, since this set 
is defined in terms of what would happen if the Twombly/Iqbal standard did 
govern, it is the same regardless of which pleading standard actually does 
govern. Consequently, the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD 
cases is immune to selection-induced compositional problems. 
B. Numerical Examples Illustrating the Negatively Affected Share  
To make all of this concrete, consider Table 2. Its first column repeats the 
made-up data on case types that I used in Example 2 of Table 1. Because there 
are eight MDMG cases, seven AMG cases, and zero SMG cases in this example, 
there are a total of fifteen negatively affected cases, as indicated in the row of 
Table 2 labeled “Number of Negatively Affected Cases.” Under Twombly/Iqbal, 
MTDs are filed in seventy cases—forty in MM cases, and thirty in AM cases. 
Thus, the negatively affected share is fifteen divided by seventy, or 21%, as the 
“Negatively Affected Share” row displays. 
Unfortunately, we cannot use observable data to calculate the negatively 
affected share, because we cannot separate MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases from 
MGMG cases—MGMG cases observed under Twombly/Iqbal do not come with a 
docket entry stating that they would have had MTDs filed, much less filed and 
granted, had the Conley pleading standard been in place.146 But all is not lost, 
because the difference in the number of motions that are actually granted does 
provide important information.  
 
Section III.C). Thus, the negatively affected share is the right measure of the relative 
importance of these cases among Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. Recall, in addition, that my 
focus on the Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases necessarily entails ignoring all cases that do not 
involve a motion to dismiss filed under Twombly/Iqbal. 




where MTDTI is the number of MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. 
146.  This is another example of the fundamental evaluation problem discussed above: it is not 
possible to observe the same case simultaneously subjected to two different pleading 
regimes. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
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Table 2.  
examples illustrating the negatively affected share, the lower bound 
on the negatively affected share, and the discovery-prevented share  
 
  example 2 example 4 
mGmG 20 20 
mDmD 12 12 
mDmG 8 8 
mm total 40 40 
non-selection 
(mm) cases 
judicial behavior effect  20% 20% 
amG  7 7 defendant 
selection 
cases amD  23 23 
mGd 5 5 plaintiff 
selection 
cases mDd 5 5 
  mGs 0 0 
mDs 0 0 




smD 0 21 
conley 50 50 
twombly/iqbal  50 44 observed mtd 
grant rates cross-pleading regime grant-rate 
difference  
0 -6 
number of negatively affected cases 15 24 
number of twombly/iqbal mtd cases  70 100 
negatively 
affected 
share negatively affected share 21% 24% 
mtd grants under twombly/iqbal  35 44 
mtd grants under conley  25 25 
difference  10 19 




share lower bound on negatively affected 
share  
14% 19% 
number of discovery-prevented cases 15 15 
number of twombly/iqbal mtd cases  70 100 
discovery-
prevented 
share discovery-prevented share 21% 15% 
 
The number of MTDs actually granted under Conley equals the number of 
MGMG, MGD, and MGS cases, while the number actually granted under 
Twombly/Iqbal equals the number of MGMG, AMG, and SMG cases.
147 When we 
subtract the number of MTDs actually granted under Conley from the number 
 
147.  Recall that the discussion in Section III.C established that there will be no MA cases, and 
thus no MGA cases, if defendants are rational. 
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actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, the result thus equals (i) the number of 
MDMG, AMG, and SMG cases minus (ii) the number of MGD and MGS cases.
148 
Thus, the cross-pleading regime difference in the number of grants does not 
isolate the number of negatively affected cases, given by (i), because we cannot 
avoid subtracting the number of MGD and MGS cases in (ii) when we compute 
cross-pleading regime difference. However, we do know one very important 
additional fact: the number of MGD and MGS cases must always be at least 
zero. Therefore, if there are any MGD or MGS cases, subtracting (ii) has the 
effect of forcing the cross-pleading regime difference in the number of MTDs 
actually granted to take on a value less than the number of MGMG, MGD, and 
MGS cases. In other words, the change in the observed number of MTD grants 
is a lower bound on the number of negatively affected cases. This is my key 
result, because the ratio of the cross-pleading regime difference in the number 
of MTDs actually granted to the number of MTDs actually filed under 
Twombly/Iqbal is therefore a lower bound on the negatively affected share of 
Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases.149 
At this point it is useful to look again at the first column of Table 2. In the 
block labeled “Lower Bound on Negatively Affected Share,” we see that there 
are thirty-five cases with MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and 
twenty-five under Conley, yielding a difference in MTD grants across pleading 
regimes equal to ten. Dividing ten by the number of cases with MTDs actually 
filed under Twombly/Iqbal, which is seventy, we have our lower bound on the 
negatively affected share—14%, which is less than the 21% negatively affected 
share for Example 2, as promised. It would be better to be able to determine 
 
148.  Formally, the number of grants under Twombly/Iqbal equals MGMG+MDMG+AMG+SMG, 
and the number of grants under Conley equals MGMG+MGD+MGS. When we subtract the 
latter from the former, the number of MGMG cases drops out, and we are left with 
 .  
 




The fact that it is a lower bound means that NASLB ≤ NAS, where NAS is the negatively 
affected share defined in note 145. When there are no MGS or MGD cases, my lower bound 
exactly equals the negatively affected share. Thus, the lower bound and the negatively 
affected share are equal when there is no settlement selection, which rules out MGS cases, 
and no plaintiff selection, which rules out MGD cases. 
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this 21% figure, of course. But the lower bound of 14% is a lot closer to 21% 
than the difference in the cross-pleading regime grant-rate difference—which 
is zero in Example 2. 
C. The Relationship Between the Discovery-Prevented Share and the Negatively 
Affected Share  
Now consider Example 4, which appears in the second column of Table 2. 
This example differs from Example 2 only in that it has some settlement 
selection. In Example 4, there are a total of thirty SM cases—those that would 
be settled under Conley but have MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal. Of these, 
nine are SMG cases that would have MTDs granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and 
the other twenty-one are SMD cases, which would have their defendants’ 
motions denied. 
The calculations in the “Lower Bound on Negatively Affected Share” block 
of Table 2 show that the actual negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal 
MTD cases in this Example is 24%,150 while the lower bound is 19%.151 But the 
main point of interest in comparing Example 2 and Example 4 has to do with 
the rows concerning the discovery-prevented share. The number of discovery-
prevented cases equals the number of MDMG and AMG cases, of which there are 
fifteen in Example 2. Thus, the actual discovery-prevented share in Example 2 
is fifteen divided by seventy, or 21%.152 In Example 2, my lower bound on the 
negatively affected share is 14%, less than the discovery-prevented share. This 
is not surprising, since there are no SMG cases in Example 2, which means that 
all negatively affected cases are discovery-prevented cases.153 
 
150.  There are 24 negatively affected cases: 8 MDMG, 7 AMG, and 9 SMG. There are 100 cases 
with MTDs filed under Twombly/Iqbal (40 MM, 30 AM, and 30 SM), and 24 out of 100 
amounts to 24%. 
151.  There are 44 MTDs actually granted under Twombly/Iqbal, and 25 under Conley. The 
difference between these numbers is 19, which amounts to 19% of the 100 Twombly/Iqbal 
MTD cases. 
152.  The discovery-prevented share equals . 
153.  Note that the discovery-prevented share can be written as  
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By comparison, there are nine SMG cases in Example 4, so not all negatively 
affected cases are discovery-prevented. The discovery-prevented share in 
Example 4 equals 15%—fifteen AMG cases out of one hundred total 
Twombly/Iqbal MTD cases. This is less than my lower bound on the negatively 
affected share, which was 19% in Example 4. It can be shown that the cross-
pleading regime difference in the number of MTD grants will be less than the 
number of discovery-prevented cases (MDMG and AMG) if and only if the 
number of SMG cases—settlement selection cases that add to the number of 
actual MTD grants under Twombly/Iqbal—is less than the combined number of 
MGD and MGS cases, which are cases that, as a result of switching from Conley 
to Twombly/Iqbal, exit the status of having MTDs granted.154 This condition 
holds in Example 2, since there are no SMG cases, and there are five MGD cases. 
The condition does not hold in Example 4, since there are nine SMG cases, five 
MGD cases, and no MGS cases. In sum, we cannot say that my lower bound on 
the negatively affected share is always a lower bound on the discovery-
prevented share. 
There is a simple condition under which there will be no SM cases at all. 
That would imply there will be no SMG cases, which in turn is a sufficient 
condition for my lower bound on the negatively affected share to be a lower 
bound on the discovery-prevented share. But the condition that rules out SM 
cases is not innocuous, and I am pessimistic that it could be verified 
empirically.155 So, whether my lower bound on the negatively affected share 
should also be interpreted as a lower bound on the discovery-prevented share is 
really one for individual readers to answer for themselves, based on the 





and since SMG=0 in this example, DPS=NAS. 
154.  The difference across pleading regimes in the number of grants can be written as 
MDMG+AMG+[SMG – {MGD+MGS}]. Thus, we will have ΔGrants≤ MDMG+AMG 
whenever SMG≤MGD+MGS. Dividing both sides by MTDTI then yields the result that 
NASLB≤DPS. 
155.  See supra note 138. 
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D. Relating My Lower Bound to the Difference in Grant Rates Across Pleading 
Regimes  
In this Section, I show that the difference in grant rates across pleading 
regimes and my lower bound on the negatively affected share have a simple 
relationship. Recall that my lower bound is the ratio of the observed change in 
actual MTD grants, ∆ MTD Grants for short, to the number of MTDs actually 
filed under Twombly/Iqbal. It follows that the lower bound can be expressed as 
(i) the MTD grant rate under Twombly and Iqbal, minus (ii) the actual number 
of MTD grants under Conley, divided by the actual number of MTDs filed 
under Twombly and Iqbal.156 The ratio in (ii) can be shown to equal (a) the 
MTD grant rate actually observed under Conley, times the ratio of (b) the 
number of MTDs filed under Conley to (c) the number of MTDs filed under 
heightened pleading.157 Finally, by adding and subtracting the Conley MTD 
grant rate, I obtain the result that my lower bound can be written as158 
 









where the subscripts “Conley” and “TI” indicate the Conley and Twombly/Iqbal regimes, 
respectively. 
157.  This claim follows by multiplying and dividing the final term in note 156 by the number of 




since the first ratio on the right hand side of the top equation is the Conley MTD grant rate. 











The first term, ΔGrantRate, is the difference in grant rates—which is the 
measure that other studies use. The term GrantRateConley is the observed MTD 
grant rate under Conley. The term MTDTI is the number of MTDs filed during 
the Twombly/Iqbal period, and the term MTDConley is the number of MTDs filed 
during the Conley period.  
Thus, my lower bound on the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal 
MTD cases equals the difference in grant rates across pleading regimes—which 
is what previous authors have used to measure Twombly and Iqbal’s effects—




There is an intuitive explanation for the particular form of the second factor 
in the correction term in (2). Suppose there were defendant selection (AM 
cases), but no other forms of party selection. Since that would mean there were 
no MGD or MGS cases, my lower bound on the negatively affected share would 
exactly equal the negatively affected share itself. Therefore, the correction term 
linking my lower bound on the negatively affected share to the difference in 
grant rates across pleading regimes also would link the grant-rate difference 
exactly to the negatively affected share. So, when there is defendant selection 
only, the lower bound correction term fully corrects for selection. 
 
Adding and subtracting gC then 








where I have used the fact that the ratio of MTDTI to itself equals 1. The right hand side of 
this final equation is the expression in the main text, with ΔGrantRate ≡ gTI–gConley, 
GrantRateConley ≡ gConley, and ΔMTDs Filed ≡ MTDTI–MTDConley. 
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In addition, if there were only defendant selection, the difference across 
pleading regimes in the numbers of MTDs actually filed would exactly equal 
the number of AM cases. Therefore, the ratio in the correction term in  
(2) would exactly equal the share of Twombly/Iqbal MTDs that are filed as a 
causal result of the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. It is easy to see that this 
relationship does not generally hold when there is either plaintiff or settlement 
selection.159 
In sum, it makes intuitive sense to think of the ratio in the correction term 
in (2) as a partial correction for defendant selection. In the special case when 
there is only defendant selection, the correction term fully accounts for this 
selection. When there is also plaintiff or settlement selection, the correction 
term in (2) will include some effects related to these form of selection. The less 
selection there is of non-defendant selection types, the more accurate this 
partial correction will be. But holding constant the amounts of other forms of 
selection, the correction term will tend to be greater the greater is the amount 
of defendant selection.160 
Finally, consider the sign of the correction term in (2). Both GrantRateConley 
and MTDTI are necessarily positive. This means that the correction term will be 
positive if the number of MTDs actually filed rises between the Conley and 
Twombly/Iqbal periods. Because the FJC MTD report shows that the number of 
MTDs actually filed did increase,161 the correction term is positive as an 
empirical matter. It follows immediately that my lower bound on the 
negatively affected share will exceed the difference in grant rates across 
pleading regimes. Empirically, then, the difference in grant rates across 
pleading regimes must be an even lower bound than the one I derived in 
equation (1). I now turn to the empirical task of calculating how much the 
difference between these measures matters. 
vi.  empirical results 
In this Part, I estimate the lower bound on the negatively affected share for 
each of three nature-of-suit case categories. In Section VI.A, I discuss the data I 
use, which come from the two FJC reports I discussed in Section I.C. I then 
 
159.  See the examples in Table 2 supra. 
160.  Note that if we knew that the only form of settlement selection was through SM cases—
settlement-prevented cases—then we could say the same thing about these as well. 
161.  See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 tbl.1. 
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report and discuss the resulting lower bound estimates. In Section VI.B, I 
discuss possible threats to the validity of my estimates. 
A. The FJC Data  
In its original report, the FJC collected data on case filings, MTD filings, 
and MTD grant rates; it studied the rate at which movants ultimately prevailed 
in its updated study.162 In this Section, I first describe the statistics that I use 
from the filing data set. I then discuss the statistics concerning the party that 
prevails, which come from the grants data set as augmented in the updated FJC 
report. 
1. The FJC’s Filing Data Set 
As I discussed in Section I.C, the original FJC report lists the number of 
cases plaintiffs filed in twenty-three U.S. district courts during each of two 
windows: October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, and October 1, 2009, 
through June 30, 2010, to which I refer respectively as the “Conley” and “Iqbal” 
study periods.163 For these cases, the FJC then counted the number of Rule 
12(b)(6) MTDs defendants filed within the first ninety days of each case’s 
filing. 
Table 3 presents the numbers of case filings, Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filings, 
and the implied Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing rates from the FJC’s filing data set 
for the three nature-of-suit categories I consider here.164 The first row contains 
data for all types of cases pooled together, except those that the FJC coded as 
involving financial instruments, employment discrimination cases, or civil 
rights cases.165 I will refer to this category as the category of “total other cases.” 
I exclude financial-instruments cases because the FJC MTD report shows that 
there was an enormous spike in the number of financial-instruments cases filed 
over the FJC’s study period,166 and this spike presumably is due to increases in 
the underlying number of controversies in this category resulting from the 
 
162.  See supra Section I.C. 
163.  See id. Note that I used the term “Iqbal study period” rather than “Twombly/Iqbal study 
period” since the FJC data do not include cases filed or MTDs adjudicated in the period 
between Twombly and Iqbal.  
164.  See Appendix A for details concerning these data. 
165.  I provide raw case counts by category in Appendix A Table 1 and Appendix A Table 3. 
166.  See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 tbl.1. 
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financial and housing crises rather than to changes in pleading standards. I 
exclude civil rights and employment discrimination cases from the total other 
cases category since I examine these two nature-of-suit categories separately. 
The second row of Table 3 provides figures for employment discrimination 
cases, and the third row provides figures for civil rights cases. These figures 
differ somewhat from those that appear in the FJC report’s Table 1 because, 
unlike the FJC, I have excluded ADA cases from this category due to changes in 
ADA substantive law enacted by the 2008 ADA Amendments.167 
Column (1) of my Table 3 provides the numbers of cases that were filed 
during the Conley period. Column (4) provides the corresponding counts for 
the Iqbal period. These figures imply that the number of total other cases filed 
fell by 1.6% over the FJC’s study period. The figures also imply that the 
number of employment discrimination and civil rights cases grew 2% and 7%, 
respectively. All three of these figures are consistent with the model of selection 
I discussed in Part III.168 
 
Table 3.  
data concerning case and mtd filings 
 
 conley period iqbal period 
 
167.  The FJC included ADA cases together with civil rights cases (while analyzing Title VII 
employment discrimination cases separately, as I do here). As I explain above, see supra note 
69, including ADA cases will conflate behavioral responses to pleading-regime change with 
the 2008 ADA Amendments’ broadening of ADA coverage. This broadened coverage 
plausibly would lead to increases in the number of filed ADA cases for reasons wholly 
unrelated to changes in pleading standards. As with financial-instruments cases, then, ADA 
cases should be excluded from the analysis. I am able to exclude ADA cases only because of 
the very generous efforts of Joe Cecil, lead author of the FJC reports, who kindly provided 
me with several supplemental tables. These tables show that the number of ADA 
employment cases filed increased from 268 to 378 between the Conley and Iqbal study 
periods, while the number of other ADA cases increased from 449 to 851. These increases are 
very large—41% and 89%, respectively—so it is important to exclude these cases from 
consideration. I am very grateful to Cecil for his assistance. See discussion in Appendix A for 
more details on the figures in Table 3. 
168.  The drop in case filings for total other cases is consistent with the presence of either or both 
plaintiff selection effects and settlement selection effects. The increase in case filings for civil 
rights and employment discrimination cases requires the presence of some SM cases that 
would be settled before case filing under Conley but that, under Twombly and Iqbal, are 
instead filed by plaintiffs and attacked with MTDs by defendants. There could also be 
plaintiff selection so long as it is outweighed by the kind of settlement selection just 
described.  
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39,912 1241 3.1 39,288 1968 5.0 
employment 
discrimination 
3795 262 6.9 3871 349 9.0 
civil rights 3495 376 10.8 3747 454 12.1 
Notes:  
See Appendix A Table 1 concerning figures in columns (1) and (4). 
See Appendix A Table 3 concerning figures in columns (2) and (5). 
Figures in column (3) are rounded ratios of column (2) to column (1). 
Figures in column (6) are rounded ratios of column (5) to column (4). 
 
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 3 provide the fraction of filed cases in which 
the FJC reports that the defendant filed MTDs in each period. For all three 
nature-of-suit categories, the Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing rate increased between 
the FJC’s two study periods. Among total other cases, the filing rate increased 
from 3.1% to 5.0%. For employment discrimination and civil rights cases, the 
12(b)(6) MTD filing rate increased from 6.9% to 9.0 percent, and from 10.8% 
to 12.1%, respectively. 
2. The FJC’s Grants Data Set  
The grants data in the original FJC report included data on 1921 judicial 
orders.169 Some of these involved grants with leave to amend. As I discussed in 
Section I.C, when a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD is granted with leave to amend, the 
plaintiff may file an amended complaint, which the defendant may challenge 
with a new Rule 12(b)(6) MTD, and so on. The FJC’s original report shows 
that MTDs are granted with leave to amend in a nontrivial share of cases, and 
it also shows that the with-leave-to-amend disposition category became more 
common between the Conley and Iqbal study periods.170 
My methodological discussion, on the other hand, focuses on MTD grants 
that terminate a plaintiff’s claim, leaving open the question of how to deal with 
MTDs that are granted with leave to amend. The FJC’s updated report answers 
this question by following all cases that had a Rule 12(b)(6) motion granted 
 
169.  See CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 14 tbl.4. 
170.  See supra text accompanying notes 114-119. 
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with leave to amend to determine a definitive resolution to the MTD stage of 
litigation. The FJC was able to do so in all but eighty of the cases represented 
in the original report’s grants data set.171 
Table A-1 of the updated report provides data on the party who “ultimately 
prevailed” in cases in which the FJC read and coded an order resolving a 
motion to dismiss.172 According to the FJC’s coding scheme, the movant 
prevailed when a court “granted the last motion to dismiss in whole or in part 
and no opportunity to amend the complaint remained.”173 This definition 
covers both (i) grants without leave to amend and (ii) cases in which the court 
gave leave to amend but in which the respondent did not file a timely amended 
complaint.174 The FJC coded the respondent as prevailing when “the last 
motion to dismiss was denied, or [when] . . . the respondent submitted an 
amended complaint and the movant chose not to respond with an additional 
motion to dismiss.”175 
When the movant prevails according to the FJC’s definition, the 
respondent’s claim is terminated, eliminating all access to discovery and future 
litigation costs for the claims involved. And when the respondent prevails, she 
will have access to discovery.176 As such, the FJC’s definition of a movant’s 
having prevailed corresponds directly to the conceptual role that an MTD grant 
played in the methodological discussion in Parts II-V. Consequently, I will use 
the movant’s rate of prevailing as my measure of the grant rate for purposes of 
estimating my lower bound on the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal 
MTD cases. 
It is important to emphasize that the FJC codes a movant as prevailing if 
she prevailed on any of the claims she challenged via an initial Rule 12(b)(6) 
 
171.  The updated report explains that fifty-two of the orders in the grants data set corresponded 
to cases represented more than once in the original grants study, due to an earlier MTD 
granted with leave to amend that was “followed by an amended complaint, a motion to 
dismiss the amended complaint, and an order resolving the motion.” CECIL ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 3 n.4. Thus, there were actually 1869 unique cases represented in the original 
report’s grant study. 
172.  Id. at 7 tbl.A-1. 
173.  Id. at 3. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. 
176.  Of course, the movant could try to limit or eliminate discovery access via the same set of 
Rule 26 procedures as are available in the absence of MTDs. 
  
locking the doors to discovery?  
2331 
 
MTD.177 This is the right definition of “prevailing” to use empirically. To see 
why, just consider Iqbal. As Justice Kennedy noted, John Ashcroft and Robert 
Mueller were only two of many defendants whom Javaid Iqbal sued in his 
complaint alleging twenty-one causes of action.178 The Supreme Court’s 
holding in Iqbal thus eliminated only defendants Ashcroft and Mueller from 
the litigation, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly disclaimed any opinion 
as to “the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against the defendants who are 
not before us.”179 Thus, Iqbal itself falls into the category of cases in which the 
Rule 12(b)(6) MTD was granted as to only some of the plaintiff’s claims. 
I list statistics concerning the percentage of cases in which the movant 
prevails in Table 4.180 The first two columns show this percentage for the 
Conley and Iqbal study periods, and the third column shows the change across 
pleading regimes. The movant prevailed in 55.2% of total other cases under 
Conley, a figure that rose to 56.3% under Twombly and Iqbal. Roughly speaking, 
then, there was no change in the observed share of cases whose claims all 
ultimately reached discovery despite having faced a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD. 
Recall, though, that in the presence of defendant selection, even such a null 
finding need not contradict the hypothesis that Twombly and Iqbal have 
harmed plaintiffs or reduced discovery access.181 
 
Table 4. 
percentage of cases in which movant prevails  
 
case type conley iqbal change 
total other cases 55.2 56.3 1.1 
employment discrimination 60.9 61.1 0.2 
civil rights 60.3 68.1 7.8 
 
177.  The FJC could have instead coded movants as prevailing only if they prevailed on all claims 
challenged. 
178.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009). 
179.  Id. at 1952. 
180.  For the employment discrimination cases, these figures come from the “Movant” row of 
Table A-1 of the FJC’s updated report. CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1. For the civil 
rights cases and total other cases categories, the reported figures are my own calculations 
based on that table and on supplemental tables kindly provided by Joe Cecil to allow me to 
exclude (the small number of) orders relating to ADA cases. I provide the raw count of cases 
represented in each category in Appendix A. See infra Appendix A tbl.4. 
181.  See Example 2, supra Table 1 and Table 2, on exactly this point. 
  




Table 4’s second row presents the movant’s rate of prevailing in 
employment discrimination cases. In each period, roughly 61% of movants 
prevailed in employment discrimination cases after filing a Rule 12(b)(6) 
MTD. Finally, the results for civil rights cases show that after Twombly and 
Iqbal had taken effect, there was about an eight-point uptick in the percentage 
of cases in which movants prevailed after filing Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs. 
3. Calculating the Lower Bound 
I now use data from Table 3 and Table 4 to calculate the correction term 
from equation (2). Column (1) of Table 5 reports the change in the number of 
MTDs filed between the Conley and Iqbal study periods. For each nature-of-
suit category, this change equals the column (5) entry from Table 3 minus the 
column (2) entry from Table 3; for example, there were 727 more MTDs 
among total other cases in the Iqbal period than during the Conley period. 
Column (2) of Table 5 reports the number of MTDs that were filed in each 
nature-of-suit category during the Iqbal period. 
 
  




calculating the correction term 
 
























87 349 0.25 60.9 15.2 
civil rights 
cases 
78 454 0.17 60.3 10.3 
 
Table 5’s column (3) is the ratio of the table’s column (1) to its column (2). 
This ratio is the part of the correction term I discussed in detail at the end of 
Section V.D. Other things equal, larger values of this ratio tend to indicate the 
presence of more defendant selection.182 The larger the ratio is, other things 
equal, the greater will be the correction term that must be added to the 
difference in grant rates across pleading regimes in order to estimate my lower 
bound on the negatively affected share. The ratio equals 0.37 for total other 
cases, 0.25 for employment discrimination cases, and 0.17 for civil rights cases. 
That suggests we can expect the correction term from equation (2) to be 
greatest for total other cases and least for civil rights cases. 
In column (4) of Table 5, I repeat the Conley-period rate at which movants 
prevail, which I also reported in the first column of Table 4. The correction 
term in equation (2) is the product of this rate and the ratio in column (3) of 
Table 5. This term is what we must add to the difference in the movant-
prevails rate to obtain the lower bound on the negatively affected share. I 
report the product of columns (3) and (4) for each nature-of-suit category in 
the final column of Table 5, which shows that the correction term is 20.4 
percentage points for total other cases, 15.2 points for employment 
discrimination cases, and 10.3 points for civil rights cases. As predicted, then, 
the correction term rises with the ratio in column (3). The greater the apparent 
amount of selection into MTD filing, the greater is the term necessary to 
 
182.  Or also, possibly, more settlement selection of the SM form. 
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correct for it in bounding the negatively affected share of Twombly/Iqbal MTD 
cases. 
In Table 6, I report the components necessary to calculate my lower 
bounds on the negatively affected share. The first column repeats the difference 
across pleading regimes in the rate at which movants prevail, which I originally 
reported in Table 4. The second column of Table 6 reports the correction term 
just calculated in Table 5. Finally, the third column of Table 6 reports the sum 
of the first two columns. For each of the three nature-of-suit categories, this 




lower bounds on the negatively affected share of cases among those 
with mtds filed under twombly and iqbal  
 
case type 













0.2 15.2 15.4 
civil rights 
cases 
7.8 10.3 18.1 
 
The estimated lower bounds are large. For total other cases, the lower 
bound is 21.5 percentage points.183 This suggests that the switch from Conley to 
Iqbal caused MTD movants to prevail—and thus plaintiffs to be negatively 
affected—on one or more claims in at least 21.5% of cases in which MTDs were 
adjudicated in the FJC’s Iqbal study period. Recall from Table that movants 
prevailed in 56.3% of MTDs filed against total other cases in the FJC’s Iqbal 
period. So another way to interpret my lower bound is that nearly two-fifths 
(21.5 ÷ 56.3 = 0.38) of cases with MTDs granted in the Iqbal period as to some 
 
183.  This estimate is statistically significant, as are the estimates of my lower bound for the 
employment discrimination and civil rights case categories, discussed infra. For details, see 
Appendix B, available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/gelbach 
_appendix_b.pdf  
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claims would not have had MTDs granted had the pleading regime not 
changed.184 
For employment discrimination cases, my lower bound on the negatively 
affected share is 15.4 percentage points. Thus, at least a fourth of the 61.1% of 
employment discrimination cases in which movants prevail in the Iqbal period 
had plaintiffs who were negatively affected as a result of the switch from Conley 
to Twombly/Iqbal. Among civil rights cases, the lower bound on the negatively 
affected share is 18.1 percentage points. The movant-prevails rate in the Iqbal 
period was 68.1% for civil rights cases, so—as with employment discrimination 
cases—at least a fourth of civil rights cases in which movants prevailed under 
Twombly/Iqbal had MTDs granted because of the switch from Conley to 
Twombly/Iqbal. 
 Why are my lower bounds so much greater than simple differences in 
grant rates across pleading regimes? Because there is so much selection. What 
drives the large correction terms in Table 5 is the fact that the increases in the 
number of MTDs filed were sizable relative to the number of MTDs filed in the 
Iqbal period. As I discussed at the end of Section V.D, the cross-pleading 
regime differences will be particularly far below my lower bound on the 
negatively affected share when this happens. 
Interestingly, the correction term is smallest for civil rights cases, and 
smaller for employment discrimination cases than for total other cases. This 
pattern suggests less selection for civil rights and employment discrimination 
cases. One explanation for this finding is that these case types had greater 
MTD filing rates than did other cases under Conley. Table 3 shows that the 
MTD filing rate for employment discrimination cases under Conley was more 
than double the rate for total other cases, while the corresponding rate for civil 
rights cases was more than triple that for total other cases. Perhaps, then, there 
was simply less room for a large defendant selection effect among civil rights 
and employment discrimination cases than among others, since defendants 
were already challenging the sufficiency of these cases relatively frequently. 
Whatever the reason for the pattern of results, though, they leave open the 
possibility that civil rights and employment discrimination cases have not been 
more negatively affected than other cases. 
 
184.  It is critical to remember, from Part III, that some of these negatively affected cases would 
not have faced MTDs at all had the Conley pleading standard governed instead. 
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B. Potential Threats to the Validity of My Empirical Results 
In this Section, I discuss two ways my methodology might go wrong as an 
empirical matter. The first is that the number of underlying controversies 
might have grown, or other characteristics might have changed. The second 
has to do with the way the FJC collected its data. I discuss these issues in turn.  
1. Instability or Growth in the Set of Underlying Controversies  
There are exogenous and endogenous ways that the set of underlying 
controversies might have changed between the Conley and Iqbal study periods. 
On the exogenous side, perhaps the number of underlying controversies just 
grows at a fixed rate every year (say, due to population or economic growth). 
In this case, I would tend to overstate the correction term in equation (2). That 
is true because the number of MTDs filed in the Iqbal period would rise simply 
due to the passage of time, rather than because of party selection effects, 
inflating my correction term.185 
Perhaps some of the increase in the number of MTDs filed in employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases might come from such an exogenous-
growth source.186 But it seems very unlikely that exogenous growth in 
controversies can explain much of the lower bound for the total other cases 
nature-of-suit category. For this category, the rate at which MTDs were filed 
increased from 3.1% to 5.0% of case filings,187 which is more than a 60% 
increase,188 while the overall number of cases filed in the total other cases 
category actually fell slightly between the Conley and Iqbal study periods.189 
 
185.  To see this, recall that the correction term equals the product of the Conley grant rate and the 
ratio of the change in the number of MTDs filed to the number of MTDs filed under Iqbal. 
The Conley grant rate would not be affected by an across-the-board increase in the number 
of controversies. But such an increase would cause the latter ratio to rise, causing me to 
overstate my correction term.  
186.  For these nature-of-suit categories, the number of cases filed did actually rise. See supra text 
accompanying note 168. One interesting possibility is that case filings respond to the 
business cycle, which swung down substantially between 2005-2006 and 2009-2010; see 
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 130, for a discussion of the cyclical aspects of employment 
discrimination litigation. 
187.  See supra Table 3. 
188.  That is, 5.0% - 3.1% = 1.9%, and 1.9% ÷ 3.1% = 0.613. 
189.  See supra Table 3. 
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This pattern seems to suggest party selection, not exogenous growth, as the 
primary driver of my results. 
In principle, my results could also be affected by changes in the number of 
controversies that result from endogenous primary-behavior responses to 
changes in pleading policy. After the switch from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal, 
repeat-player defendants—like, say, large employers—might believe 
themselves less likely to face lawsuits, and less likely to have to bear discovery 
burdens when they do. They might thus engage in more discrimination, or be 
less vigilant in policing any unlawful behavior of supervisors, or worry less 
about strike suits. Such primary-behavior responses would induce additional 
lawsuits over and above what would happen in the primary-behavior baseline. 
One of the facts of life for nonexperimental empirical research, though, is 
that there are always such potential counterexplanations. At present I do not 
know of a good way to test either the exogenous or endogenous growth stories. 
Perhaps future research will be able to address them. 
2. Are the FJC’s Data Useful? 
In commenting on the original FJC MTD report, the then-Chair of the 
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules, Judge Mark Kravitz, suggested that 
results from the FJC’s filing and grants data sets should not be used together: 
  A succinct but potentially misleading statement of the central 
finding would be that the rate of filing 12(b)(6) motions has increased, 
while the rate of granting the motions [has] held constant. A natural 
conclusion would be that a constant rate of granting an increased 
number of motions means that more cases are dismissed for failure to 
state a claim. But the comparison is made between two data sets, and it 
is difficult to confirm or deny this possible conclusion.190 
But the fact that two data sets are involved does not by itself suggest there 
is any problem with using the FJC’s data together. Empirical researchers make 
comparisons using multiple data sets all the time—across time, across surveys, 
across geographical areas, and so on. While there could be fatal inconsistencies 
between data sets, I do not believe the two FJC MTD reports contain any 
concrete reasons for concern. 
 
190.  Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, supra note 19, at 53. 
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In personal communication with me, the lead author of the FJC reports, Joe 
Cecil, has stated that the FJC does “regard these data sets as too inconsistent to 
yield a valid estimate of a combined effect.”191 The FJC’s concern here 
presumably is that its grant study is based on a cross section of judicial orders 
filed during a fixed window of time, rather than a cohort study of orders that 
flow from the set of cases and Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed during the periods 
corresponding to the filing study. For such differences in data collection 
methods to be important, there would have to be substantial compositional 
differences between the sets of cases that are filed in the nine months following 
October 1 and those cases that are at risk of having a judicial order issued in the 
six months after the following January. But the FJC does not provide any 
concrete reason to think this is actually the case. 
An additional potential problem is that some cases with MTDs adjudicated 
in the Iqbal period might have been filed before Iqbal, or even before Twombly, 
if the cases have had enough amended complaints. Consequently, the cross 
section of orders that the FJC analyzed might not fully represent the steady 
state that will ultimately develop over time. These are standard concerns when 
one compares cross sections of dynamic processes that are sampled on either 
side of a policy change. 
I would certainly prefer a cohort-based measure that followed a fixed set of 
cases from their filing, to the filing of initial Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs, and then 
over the period necessary to determine who ultimately prevails on these initial 
motions. But given that no such measure currently exists, I believe that the 
comprehensive and representative nature of the FJC’s cross section is the best 
currently available alternative. In addition, my hunch is that whatever the 
compositional mismatch in the cases represented by the FJC’s cross section of 
orders and its cohort of filed cases, it is unlikely to greatly affect my lower 
bounds’ values. 
For a large amount of such mismatch to occur, the characteristics of cases in 
the cross section on which the FJC’s grants study is based must look very 
different from the characteristics of cases that would appear in a longitudinal 
sample of cases with judicial orders resolving Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs. Given that 
most MTD adjudication will happen early in a case’s lifetime,192 such 
 
191.  E-mail from Joe Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report, to author (Dec. 5, 2011, 11:22 AM EST) (on 
file with author). 
192.  Rule 12(a)(1) states that in the absence of a contrary rule or federal statute, a defendant 
“must serve an answer: (i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and 
complaint.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A). If the defendant has timely waived service under 
Rule 4(d), then this period extends to 60 days after the request for a waiver (90 days if such 
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differences seem unlikely. Of course, I could be wrong about the facts. The FJC 
could provide some guidance on this point by releasing some information 
about the filing dates of cases included in its grants study.193 Fortunately, Cecil 
has told me that the FJC plans to release its data within the next several 
months.194 
Finally, I must say that I find the FJC’s position on this issue puzzling. 
Does the FJC really believe that the cross sections from which its grants data 
were drawn are importantly unrepresentative of the cohorts of cases filed 
before and after Twombly/Iqbal? If so, why did the FJC commence work on its 
reports in the first place? And why did it release either report to the public? 
The original report declares that “this study was designed to assess changes in 
motions to dismiss and decisions on such motions over time in broad 
categories of civil cases.”195 How can one “assess changes” from a data set if the 
observations it contains on the two time periods it covers cannot be compared? 
In sum, while I of course respect both Judge Kravitz’s and the FJC’s 
position on these points, I do not believe that either has made a convincing 
 
request was sent to the defendant outside the United States). FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
There are good reasons why a failure-to-state-a-claim defense can be expected to be raised 
before such date as an answer is served. Without an order dismissing a plaintiff’s claims, a 
defendant will be susceptible to discovery. Therefore, asserting failure to state a claim as 
part of an answer, as Rule 12(h)(2) allows, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(2), does not stop the 
discovery clock. A defendant who answers a complaint still does retain the option of 
asserting failure to state a claim as a defense as part of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. Such a motion might be adjudicated before discovery, but it also might not. 
Similarly, a protective order under Rule 26 might be granted, but it also might not. As a 
general rule then, defendants looking to avoid discovery will assert the failure-to-state-a-
claim defense in Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which “must be made before pleading if a 
responsive pleading is allowed.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). Thus, we can expect the MTDs 
relevant to this discussion to be filed early in the litigation. 
193.  On this point, Cecil informed me as part of our e-mail communication that “many of the 
orders [the FJC uses] to estimate the post-Iqbal grant rate were from cases filed before Iqbal 
was decided, and even more were filed before the appellate court provided guidance to the 
district courts.” E-mail from Joe Cecil to author, supra note 191. Unfortunately, I do not 
know how many “many” is, which is important because the FJC’s post-Iqbal sample is quite 
large, containing 1200 orders. Moreover, this is problematic only to the extent that 
amendment behavior, and subsequent MTD filing, differs importantly as a result of 
Twombly and Iqbal. Cecil has suggested to me that party selection effects of the type I 
consider in this Note can be expected to change amendment and subsequent MTD-filing 
behavior following Twombly and Iqbal. Perhaps. But these points of conjecture can be settled 
only with data that only the FJC has as of this writing. 
194.  Id. 
195.  CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
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argument against using the data from the FJC’s two studies in the way that I 
do. I will certainly be prepared to revise my view should future reasons or 
evidence come to light on this point, and I look forward to having a chance to 
assess the FJC’s full data set firsthand. 
vii .  questions for future investigation 
By taking party selection seriously, this Note begins to fill an important gap 
in the existing empirical literature on Twombly and Iqbal. A key remaining 
question concerns the merits of cases in which plaintiffs have been negatively 
affected due to Twombly and Iqbal. A substantial negatively affected share 
might be socially desirable, if affected cases have low enough merit. This would 
especially be true if affected cases tend to involve the kind of substantial 
discovery expense that motivated the Supreme Court’s Twombly and Iqbal 
opinions. 
I hope to use data on the adjudication of defense summary-judgment 
motions to attack the low-merit question. One can view Twombly, and Iqbal by 
extension, as asking judges to forecast the results of discovery and thus the 
likely outcome of defense summary-judgment motions.196 If judges are 
successful at this task, then cases that would have gone through discovery and 
been dismissed pursuant to defense summary-judgment motions under Conley 
will now be dismissed before discovery at the MTD stage. This culling of weak 
cases will tend to reduce defendants’ win rate in summary judgment motions. 
Thus, determining whether this win rate has fallen, and if so by how much, 
might provide important evidence on the quality of cases affected by Twombly 
and Iqbal. Future conceptual and empirical work based on summary judgment 
motions might well bear fruit, and this is a topic on which I am currently 
engaged. 
 
196.  Justice Souter said as much in Twombly: “Asking for plausible grounds to infer an [illegal 
non-compete] agreement . . . calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 556 (2007). For an example of this idea in action, see Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1309 (2011), which held that plaintiffs had “adequately pleaded 
materiality” in the securities fraud context because their complaint’s allegations “suffice to 
‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence’” that the defendant firm 
had failed to disclose information that a reasonable investor would want to know, which 
would be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ claim if unrebutted. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
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That said, as scholars and policymakers debate possibilities for further 
pleading reform, it is important to keep in mind that empirical evidence can tell 
one only so much. This is true partly because not every positive question can be 
answered with data, and partly because many of the key judgments about 
access to discovery, and the resulting balance of power between plaintiffs and 
defendants, are fundamentally normative. Even so, it would be a mistake to 
look at the positive and normative questions in isolation. When considering 
potential reforms to pleading and discovery, we must understand which types 
of plaintiffs will be able to cross the threshold to discovery, and which will find 
its door barred. 
conclusion   
In this Note, I discuss the interplay between party selection effects, changes 
in MTD grant rates, and heightened pleading. A key negative result is that the 
conventional focus on changes in MTD grant rates after Twombly and Iqbal 
tells us relatively little about how Twombly and Iqbal have affected fixed sets of 
cases. While others have pointed out the possibility of party selection effects, 
few observers of Twombly and Iqbal seem to have grasped the empirical 
importance of accounting for party selection when measuring the impact of 
changes in pleading standards. Moreover, selection does not just complicate 
judicial-behavior-effect measurement—it has direct effects, too. 
On the positive side of the ledger, this Note makes several constructive 
contributions. First, I develop a measure of the share of cases that face MTDs 
under Twombly/Iqbal in which plaintiffs are negatively affected by the switch 
from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal. Negatively affected cases are those that do not 
get to discovery following a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD filing under Twombly/Iqbal, 
given that these cases either would have gotten to discovery or would have 
settled had the Conley pleading regime been in place. Second, I show how to 
use real-world data to calculate a lower bound on this measure, even though 
the measure itself is unobservable. 
Third, I actually estimate this lower bound for each of three nature-of-suit 
categories. My estimates imply that, among cases not involving financial 
instruments, civil rights, or employment discrimination, Twombly and Iqbal 
negatively affected at least 21.5% of cases that faced a Rule 12(b)(6) MTD 
during the post-Iqbal period. Estimated lower bounds for employment 
discrimination and civil rights cases are a bit lower, at 15.4% and 18.1% 
respectively. These would be substantial effects in their own right, and the fact 
that they are lower bounds tells us that the full effects may be even greater. 
  
the yale law journal 121:2270   2012  
2342 
 
appendix a:  raw case counts 
Appendix A Table 1 lists the numbers of cases filed by plaintiffs in each of 
the FJC’s filing study periods, by detailed nature-of-suit category.  
 
Appendix A, Table 1.  
number of cases filed by plaintiffs  
 
case type 
october 1, 2005 –  
june 30, 2006 
october 1, 2009 –  
june 30, 2010 
Total 49,443 52,925 
Financial Instruments 1524 4790 
Employment Discrimination 3795 3871 
Civil Rights as defined in FJC reports 4212 4976 
Sum of ADA Civil Rights 717 1229 
ADA – Employment 268 378 
ADA – Other 449 851 
Sum of non-ADA Civil Rights 3495 3747 
Civil Rights – Welfare 9 9 
Civil Rights – Voting 35 18 
Civil Rights – Accommodations 169 153 
Civil Rights – Other 3282 3567 
Sum of “Financial Instruments,” 
“Employment Discrimination,” &  
all “Civil Rights” 
9531 13,637 
Total, excluding “Financial 
Instruments,” “Employment 








Notes to Appendix A, Table 1: 
 Figures for “Total,” “Financial Instruments,” and “Employment 
Discrimination” rows come from CECIL ET AL., supra note 10, at 9 
tbl.1.  
 Figures for the following rows come from supplemental tables 
provided to author by Joe Cecil (on file with author): ADA – 
Employment; ADA – Other; Civil Rights – Accommodations; 
Civil Rights – Voting; Civil Rights – Welfare; Civil Rights – 
Other. 
 Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,” 
“Sum of Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding ‘Financial 
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used in columns (1) and (4) of Table 3 of the main text. 
 Note that Cecil et al., supra note 10, at 9 tbl. 1, states that there are 
4214 rather than 4212 cases in the FJC’s “Civil Rights” category for 
the earlier period. 
Appendix A Table 2 constructs the implied number of Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs 
filed in the FJC’s “Total” category and in the financial instruments category. I 
use these figures subsequently in Appendix A Table 3. 
 
  




Appendix A, Table 2.  
deriving the implied number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds filed by 
defendants within first 90 days of case filing, select categories  
 
























total 49,443 4.0% 1978 52,925 6.2% 3281 
financial 
instruments 
1524 4.3% 66 4790 9.6% 460 
Notes to Appendix A, Table 2: 
 Entries in columns titled “Number of Cases Plaintiffs Filed” and 
“Share with 12(b)(6) MTDs” come from Cecil et al., supra note 10, 
at 9 tbl.1. 
 Entries in columns titled “Implied Number of MTDs” are products 
of entries in corresponding “Number of Cases Plaintiffs Filed” and 
“Share with 12(b)(6) MTDs” columns. 
Appendix A Table 3 lists the number of cases, either actual or implied from 
other data, that have Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed by defendants within the first 
90 days of case filing. 
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Appendix A, Table 3.  
number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds filed by defendants within 
first 90 days of case filing  
 
case type 
october 1, 2005 –  
june 30, 2006 
october 1, 2009 –  
june 30, 2010 
Total 1978 3281 
Financial Instruments 66 460 
Employment Discrimination 262 349 
Civil Rights as defined in FJC reports 409 505 
Sum of ADA Civil Rights 33 51 
ADA – Employment  16 32 
ADA – Other  17 19 
Sum of non-ADA Civil Rights 376 454 
Civil Rights – Welfare  2 2 
Civil Rights – Voting 3 2 
Civil Rights – Accommodations 13 6 
Civil Rights – Other 358 444 
Sum of “Financial Instruments,” 
“Employment Discrimination,” &  
all “Civil Rights” 
737 1313 
Total, excluding “Financial 
Instruments,” “Employment 









Notes to Appendix A, Table 3: 
 Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,” 
“Sum of Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding  ‘Financial 
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used in main text. 
 Figures for “Total” and “Financial Instruments” rows come from 
column labeled “Implied Number, MTDs” in Appendix A Table 2. 
 Figures for the following rows come from supplemental tables 
provided to author by Joe Cecil (on file with author): 
“Employment Discrimination;” “ADA – Employment;” “ADA – 
Other;” “Civil Rights – Accommodations;” “Civil Rights – 
Voting;” “Civil Rights – Welfare;” “Civil Rights – Other.” 
Appendix A Table 4 lists the number of cases with Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs in 
which each party ultimately prevailed, among cases with judicial orders 
resolving Rule 12(b)(6) MTDs filed during the FJC’s study periods. All figures 
are based on supplemental tables provided to author by Joe Cecil on December 
7, 2011 (on file with author).197  
 
197.  Figures for “Total,” “Employment Discrimination,” and “Financial Instruments” columns 
are also reported in CECIL ET AL., supra note 11, at 7 tbl.A-1. There is one substantial 
discrepancy between Table A-1 of the updated FJC report and the figures Cecil provided me: 
Table A-1 of the updated report lists 216 financial-instruments cases in which the movant 
prevails, whereas the December 7, 2011, tables list 151 instead. Cecil has specifically 
confirmed that the 151 figure is correct. See E-Mail from Joe Cecil, Lead Author, FJC Report, 
to author (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:48 PM EST) (on file with author).  
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Appendix A, Table 4.  
number of cases with rule 12(b)(6) mtds in which movant or respondent 
ultimately prevailed, among cases with judicial orders resolving rule 




respondent movant total respondent movant total 
Total 297 384 681 414 697 1111 
Financial 
Instruments 
10 6 16 39 151 190 
Employment 
Discrimination 
36 56 92 44 69 113 
“Civil Rights” as 
defined in  
FJC reports 
70 99 169 69 140 209 
Sum of ADA  
Civil Rights 
8 5 13 8 10 18 
ADA – 
Employment 
2 2 4 3 6 9 
ADA – Other 6 3 9 5 4 9 
Non-ADA  
Civil Rights 
62 94 156 61 130 191 




all “Civil Rights” 






all “Civil Rights” 
181 223 404 262 337 599 
 
  




Notes to Appendix A, Table 4: 
 Figures in rows with bold font—“Employment Discrimination,” 
“Non-ADA Civil Rights,” and “Total, excluding  ‘Financial 
Instruments,’ ‘Employment Discrimination’ & all ‘Civil Rights’”—
are those used to calculate the rate at which movants ultimately 
prevail, reported in Table 4 of main text. 
 Figures reported in Table 4 of main text are ratio of “Movant” 
column of the present table to the corresponding “Total” column 
of the present table. For example, the present table shows that 
employment discrimination movants prevailed in 56 of 92 orders, 
for a rate of 56 divided by 92, or 60.1%, which is the figure 
reported in the bottom left cell of Table 4 of the main text. 
 
 
 
  
